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ABSTRACT
Civil protection orders are effective, yet under-used weapons in the battle against
domestic violence. In New York and in other states as well, civil orders of protection
provide unique benefits and remedies to domestic violence victims that are in addition
to, or that are in place of, the benefits the criminal system offers.
They are under used in part because they are not available to all victims. In every state,
the availability of civil protection orders is limited to those victims who are in certain
defined relationships. While many states have expanded their definitions of the types of
relationships that qualify for protection, too many states still deny protection to victims
in dating relationships, cohabitation relationships, same-sex relationships, and other
domestic relationships.
New York limits access to its civil orders of protection to fewer types of victims than any
other state. It finds the need for civil protection only where the definitions of “family
offense,” a restricted list of crimes, and “family or household member,” a restricted list
of persons, intersect. A historical explanation exists for this state of the law. The
system was created in the 1960s by a legislature that was attempting to provide
“practical help” to traditional families by taking cases out of criminal court and
placing them in the exclusive jurisdiction of the family court. Its goal, above all, was to
keep traditional families together. Civil orders of protection were invoked to serve that
goal. Over time, though, a social shift in the perception of domestic violence occurred.
As the focus moved from the goal of family cohesion to the goal of ending violence, the
courts and the legislature attempted to strike a balance between the two competing
interests. Ultimately, the legislature and the courts created, in what could perhaps be
characterized as a historical accident, the dual inquiry, or “bifurcated” system that
exists today.
The role of protection orders also shifted from serving the goal of family cohesion to
serving the goal of violence cessation. This shift in role, coupled with the parallel shift
in the state’s interests, renders the historical rationales for maintaining this system
meaningless. New York, as all other states, must reform its civil protection order
statutes to capture all victims of domestic violence, and to include all crimes as bases
for protection. To the extent the legislature can provide current rationales to maintain
its differential treatment of domestic violence victims, it must at least provide rational
reasons that bear some relation to the goals the civil order of protection statutes serve.
It is not at all clear that the legislature can satisfy that burden here.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Linda White was working in a supermarket to support
herself and her family, including her disabled brother. It was there that she
met John Strouble. The two quickly fell in love, and John moved in with
Linda a month after they had met. But, before long, John began to abuse
Linda. He would tie her up when he left their home. He savagely beat her,
and often raped her, once using a broken broomstick. On several occasions,
once after threatening to throw her from the roof of their apartment
building, he would fire his gun in the air, then hold it to her temple and pull
the trigger on an empty chamber, forcing her into a game of Russian
roulette.
In 1989, Linda looked to the Family Court in Brooklyn New York
for help. She wanted a civil order of protection. The first clerk she talked
to told her that she was not entitled to an order of protection against her
abuser because they were not married, nor did they have a child together.
She went to the next window and told a lie she thought would save her life:
“I had to lie and say I was married with kids so that I could get my order of
protection, even with a black eye.”1 After telling this lie to the clerk she
was finally given her order of protection. One month later, claiming selfdefense, Linda White shot John Strouble. At trial, the district attorney used
against her the lie that she told to the Brooklyn clerk. The jury convicted
Linda of murder in the second degree and she was sentenced to seventeen
years to life in prison.2
Mario Escalante, Susan Orellana’s stepfather, raped Susan when she
was eleven years old. He was tried and convicted of rape. Susan’s mother
divorced her daughter’s rapist. Eventually, he was released from jail and
started to stalk Susan who was now twenty-one. New York did not yet have
anti-stalking legislation,3 so criminal court was not an option. Instead, she
1

Marcela Rojas, Escape From Abuse: Clemency Seen as Milestone for Victims,
JOURNAL NEWS, May 19, 2003 at 1A.
2

In Re Linda White, Petition for Executive Clemency, (On file with the Author).
Notably, after serving 13 years, Linda White was granted clemency on Christmas Eve,
2002 by Governor Pataki. The order of protection was cited by the governor as evidence of
the abuse that Linda suffered. Press Release, Office of Governor Pataki, Governor Pataki
Grants Clemency to Four Inmates, (Dec. 24, 2002) (on file with author).
3

For a discussion of the history of stalking laws in New York, see Demetra Pappas,
Stopping New Yorkers’ stalkers: an anti-stalking law for the millennium, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 945 (2000).
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went to Family Court to obtain a civil protection order against him.
Ultimately, the court told her that it the only way it could grant a civil order
of protection order against her stalker and former rapist was if her mother
had stayed married to him.4
Despite two decades of change, domestic violence remains a threat
to women’s safety.5 Even the most conservative numbers indicate that,
each year, women victimized by their intimate partners number in the
millions.6 The statistics do not analyze the data based on whether a victim
is married to her abuser or not. Instead, they reflect the reality that women
in all forms of intimate relationships can be victims of abuse by their
partners. 7 The National Institute of Justice estimates that approximately 1.5
million women each year are assaulted or raped by an intimate partner,
while approximately 500,000 women are stalked.8 In 2000, 1,247 women
were killed by their intimate partner, or about 33% of all women killed were
killed by their intimate partners; in 2001, intimate partner violence made up
20% of all violent crime against women.9 Domestic violence is still the

4

Orellana v. Escalante, 653 N.Y.S.2d 992, 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).

5

Other than in arguing that protective order legislation should be expanded to cover
all intimate relationships, including members of same-sex relationships, this article focuses
on the threat of domestic violence as it applies to women. This focus does not mean to
deny that men also fall victim to domestic violence, but it recognizes the reality that the
majority of domestic violence victims are females. See, e.g., Callie Marie Rennison, Sara
Welchans, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Intimate Partner Violence 1 (2000) available at
http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf. (Concluding that in 2000, 85% of domestic
violence was committed against women).
6

Michele Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with
Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 52 (2000);
7

The statistics cited here are based on the prevalence of “intimate partner” violence,
which includes violence committed by current or former spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends.
See, e.g., Rennison, supra note 5 at 2. (“as defined in this report, intimate relationships
involve current or former spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends. These individuals may be of
the same gender.”).
8

See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoeenes, Nat'l Inst. of Justice & Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence 9
(2000), available at http://nij.ncjrs.org/publications. The study surveyed 8,000 women by
telephone. The study also concluded that because many women are re-victimized, an
estimated that 4.8 million rapes and assaults are perpetrated against women each year.
9

Callie Marie Rennison U.S. Dep't of Justice, Intimate Partner Violence 1993-2001, 1
(2003) available at http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov .
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leading cause of injury to women between ages 15 and 44 in the United
States—more than car accidents, muggings, and rapes combined.10
Because of its prevalence, the response to domestic violence has
been drastic and widespread, especially in the last ten years. There are
more shelters, more training programs, and more legislation. Police are
more willing to arrest abusers, and the public is more educated about the
effects of domestic violence on victims. But, while it is less likely that a
woman today would be forced to resort to homicide to protect herself as
Linda was over a decade ago, a woman today who finds herself in a
relationship like Linda’s would still have to lie to obtain a civil order of
protection in New York. Similarly, while Susan would now have the option
to seek protection in New York’s criminal court from her rapist and stalker,
it would be her only option. She would still be unable to obtain a civil order
of protection from him.
Domestic violence civil protection orders11 are effective, yet underused weapons against domestic violence. They provide remedies and
benefits to victims that are unavailable in criminal court.12 Studies suggest
that protection orders are effective in preventing and de-escalating some
forms of domestic violence.13 They also “work”14 in other ways by giving a
10

Indiana University Protection Order Project, http://www.law.indiana.edu/pop (last
visited Sept. 3rd, 2003). But, on a positive note, Dr. Rennison’s study estimates that
between the years of 1993 and 2001, the number of nonfatal violent crimes (defined as
rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault and simple assault) committed by intimate
partners against females declined by 49%. Rennison, supra note 9 at 1.
11

The term “domestic violence civil protection order” is used here to differentiate
them from other types of civil protection orders. Every state now has statutory schemes in
place that are meant to address the problem of domestic violence. They can provide for
protection, funding, services for victims, and reduced filing-fee provisions. See e.g., Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 208, § 34D, ch. 209, § 32, ch. 209A, § 5A, 7, ch. 209C, § 15 (Law. Co-op
2001). Domestic violence civil protection orders fall under these schemes. Some states do
provide for civil orders of protection outside the domestic violence context. Compare,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1809 (2003) (allowing “any person” to obtain an injunction against
another for acts of harassment) with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601-2 (2003) (“A person may
file . . . for an order of protection for the purpose of restraining a person from committing
an act included in domestic violence).
12

This article does not attempt to suggest that criminal courts should be divested of
jurisdiction over acts that are crimes; instead, this article argues that victims of domestic
violence should be able to use the civil courts to protect themselves in addition to their use
of the criminal courts.
13

Victoria Holt, M.A. Kernic, M.E. Wolf, F.P. Rivara, Do Protection Orders Affect
the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and Injury? 24 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED.
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victim a sense of control over her life.15 They are under used in part
because they are not available to all victims. In every state, the availability
of domestic violence civil protection orders is limited to those victims who
are in certain defined relationships. While many states have expanded their
definitions of the types of relationships that qualify for protection, too many
states still deny protection to victims in dating relationships, cohabitation
relationships, same-sex relationships, and other domestic relationships.
New York in particular has the most restrictive domestic violence
civil protection order coverage in the union. It only grants civil orders of
protection to victims if they satisfy two criteria. First, they must be a
member of the abuser’s “family or household.” This definition is unduly
restrictive. “Members of the same family or household means only the
following: (a) persons related by consanguinity16 or affinity;17 (b) persons

16-21 (2003).
14

This term is put in quotes as borrowed from Professors Cahn and Meier. In their
article addressing the intersection of domestic violence and clinical education they stated
that “while there is a great deal of sensational publicity about murders of women who had
obtained protection orders, in the experience of the authors, protection orders frequently do
"work"; they often deter further violence and empower the victims to make further changes
for their own safety. Success stories of this kind do not appear in the press because the
absence of violence is not considered a newsworthy event.”, Naomi Cahn, Joan Meier,
Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT.
L. J. 339, 347 (1995).
15

In this way, civil protection orders may “work” more effectively than criminal
orders of protection because the victim, not the government, is the petitioner. The victim
chooses when to file and directs the strategy of obtaining the order, all in contrast to the
criminal system. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801,
808 (1993). For instance, in Colorado, a protection order is issued automatically in all
criminal and juvenile cases involving victims. The orders are entered at the time of
arraignment and are in effect until final case disposition, which includes the time of any
probation or parole. The order restrains the defendant “from harassing, molesting,
intimidating, retaliating against or tampering with any witness to or victim of the acts. In
juvenile cases, the juvenile’s parents or legal guardian is also restrained under the order.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1-1001, 19-2-707 (2003). The court has the discretion to add or
delete conditions as the situation warrants. Id.
16

“Consanguinity” is the “relationship by blood.” Bryan A. Garner, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LEGAL USAGE 204 (2nd ed.)
17

“A relation of affinity is based upon marriage and divorce destroys the foundation of
that relation.” Escalante, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 993 citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (6th
ed. 1990).
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legally married to one another; (c) persons formerly married to one another;
and (d) persons who have a child in common regardless whether such
persons have lived together at any time.”18
Second, a victim must also establish that the abuser committed a
“family offense” against her. This list is also unduly restrictive and does
not contemplate treating a large amount of violent crimes as crimes of
domestic violence. Instead, it includes only the specific following crimes,
each of which is in turn defined by New York’s Penal Law: disorderly
conduct, harassment in the first and second degree, aggravated harassment
in the second degree, menacing in the second and third degree, reckless
endangerment, assault in the second and third degree, attempted assault,
stalking in the first, second, third, and fourth degree. As a result of this dual
inquiry, a large number of victims are denied civil protection orders entirely
either because they do not share the requisite relationship with their abusers,
or because they were not victims of the “correct” type of domestic violence.
This dual inquiry exists not only in New York’s civil system, but
also in its criminal system. As a consequence, in connection with ongoing
criminal cases, New York provides for two types of criminal orders of
protection: “family offense” orders of protection and standard orders of
protection. “Family offense” orders of protection provide more remedies
and protections than standard orders. Where an abuser is arrested and
charged with a crime, the criminal court will issue a “family offense” order
only to those same victims who are permitted to seek protection in family
court. Namely, they must also be members of the same “family or
household” as their abusers, as well as victims of a “family offense.”
New York’s system suffers from the vestiges of a scheme that its
legislature set up in the 1960’s, a time when domestic violence was thought
to be a private matter to be dealt with only in family court. This resulted in
a dual inquiry, or “bifurcated” system that left both family and non-family
members unequally protected. Nevertheless, the legislature has refused to
fix its system and to provide adequate protection to all victims from all
crimes of domestic violence. The reasons the legislature historically gave
to deny coverage no longer exist, and there are few, if any, contemporary
rationales that exist to maintain the differential treatment of victims.
Using New York as a model, this article will ultimately argue that
domestic violence civil protection order statutes in all states should be
amended to capture the remaining victims of domestic violence, and all acts

18

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812(1)(a)-(d).
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that constitute domestic violence. It will argue that all victims of domestic
violence, regardless of their marital status, should be permitted to seek the
benefits of civil protection orders.
Part I of this article will give some background information about
civil protection order legislation as it has developed in New York and other
states. Part II will generally describe the current relationship requirements.
It will conclude that New York has the most restrictive relationship
requirements in the country. Part III will briefly explain the structure and
limitations of New York’s “bifurcated” system for granting orders of
protection in civil and criminal court. Part IV will demonstrate that civil
orders of protection are effective in the battle against domestic violence.
Part V will provide a historical explanation for New York’s existing
differential treatment of domestic violence victims. Finally, Part VI will
argue that the historical explanations for New York’s differential treatment
of victims not longer exist and that its system is in need of reform to allow
all victims of domestic violence the ability to obtain civil orders of
protection.
I. BACKGROUND OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
Before the 1970s, orders of protection were sought primarily by
prosecutors in connection with existing criminal cases.19 The only way a
person could obtain a civil order of protection was in divorce court.20 The
courts’ civil powers to issue orders of protection were considered secondary
to their substantive powers, and most chose not to exercise them outside a
divorce proceeding context.21
In New York in 1962, the legislature was under increasing pressure
to deal with the “emerging” problem of domestic violence.22 It was

19

Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered
Women’s Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 227, 230-31 (Eve Buzawa & Carl Buzawa
eds. 1992).
20

Id.

21

EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE, 235 (3d ed. 2003).
22

The use of the word “emerging” here is not meant to suggest that domestic violence
did not exist prior to 1962. The opposite is certainly true. Several commentators have
suggested that until the turn of the century, crimes that took place in the home were
considered private rather than public, and therefore evaded governmental intervention or
review. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY, 72 (New York, 1987). See
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generally accepted that treatment rather than criminal prosecution was the
best solution for problems in the family.23 The legislature had the desire not
to punish, but to provide “practical help.”24 As a result, chapter 686, the
Family Court Act, which also created the procedure to obtain a civil order
of protection, was enacted.25 It gave Family Court “exclusive, original
jurisdiction over any proceeding concerning acts which constitute
disorderly conduct or an assault between spouses or between parent and
child or between members of the same family or household.”26 The
exclusive jurisdiction provisions were eliminated in 1996, and the Criminal
Court now enjoys concurrent jurisdiction over the cases that can also be
heard in Family Court.27
By the late 1970s, the problem of domestic violence and the failings
of government to respond adequately were gaining recognition across the
country.28 The clear push by victim advocates and feminists was to
also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA, 6, 11 (1985). The fact that legislators were slow to
respond most likely reflects the enduring point of view that domestic violence is a private
matter to be dealt with within the confines of the home, and, in fact, the Family Court Act
reflects this position. For a detailed discussion of the public/private distinction and its
intersection with domestic violence from a historical perspective, See Linda Gordon,
HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, 14 (New
York, 1988). But, the pervasive idea that domestic violence was a “private” matter until it
was brought into “public” view is largely ahistorical. Instead, wife-beating was protected
as an affirmative, statutory, and therefore, “public” right until the mid-nineteenth century.
Professor Reva Segal argues that as feminists began to reform chastisement laws during the
Reconstruction Era, judges began to assert that the legal system should not interfere in
cases of wife beating “in order to protect the privacy of the marriage relationship and to
promote domestic harmony.” Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating As Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117, 2119 (1996).
23

See Douglas J. Besharov, Practice Commentary, MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED
LAWS OF NEW YORK, JUDICIARY, FAMILY COURT ACT (Book 29A), § 812, at 171.
24

Id; The Family Court Act, Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court
Reorganization, 1962 McKinney Session Laws (Vol. 2) 3428, 3444 (1962).
25

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1975) (repealed).

26

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1975) (repealed).

27

The ultimate election requirement’s elimination did not eliminate the district
attorney’s discretion to decide not to pursue criminal charges against a defendant in
criminal court. N.Y. Crim. P. L. 530.12(14) (McKinney 2003).
28

See, e.g., See, e.g., D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976); Joan Zorza, The Criminal
Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990
, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 240-
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strengthen governmental responses to domestic violence, especially in the
criminal justice system.29
Until 1976, only one state other than New York had civil domestic
violence protection order legislation.30
Across the country, police,
prosecutors, and criminal courts were slow to respond to the problem, so
advocates of battered women began to push for legislation that would allow
victims relief in civil court.31 Pennsylvania passed its Protection from
Abuse Act of 1976, which created an avenue for victims of domestic
violence to obtain protection orders outside the context of criminal court or
civil divorce proceedings.32 Other states began following suit. By 1994, all
fifty states had adopted some form of domestic violence civil protection
order legislation.33 States are repeatedly revisiting their protection order
legislation to expand protection, to reduce the cost of obtaining them, to
streamline the process of obtaining them, and to create state and national
registries for the protection orders.34

279 (1992).
29

Id; See e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, U.S. Department of Justice, The Criminalization of
Domestic
Violence:
Promises
and
Limits,
6-15
(1996)
available
at:
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/crimdom.txt. The theory at the time was to criminalize
domestic violence in order to increase awareness and public response by establishing it as a
public criminal act rather than a private family matter. See e.g., Gordon, supra note 22at
22-25.
30

Clare Dalton, Elizabeth Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW, 499
(Foundation Press 2001); Janice Grau, Jeffery Fagan, & Sandra Wexler, Restraining
Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and Efficacy, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLITICS
AND WOMEN: THE AFTERMATH OF A LEGALLY MANDATED CHANGE 13, 14 (1985).
31

Buzawa Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 234 (3d ed. 1996); Andrew Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of CourtRestrained Male Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, 211 in DO ARREST AND
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds. 1996).
32

Janice Grau et al. supra note 30 at 14.

33

Mathew J. Carlson, et al., Protective Orders and Domestic Violence: Risk Factors
for Re-Abuse, 14 J. Fam. Violence 205, 206 (1999); Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 123 (2d ed. 1996).
34

See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Victims
of
Crime,
Enforcement
of
Protective
Orders,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins (Jan. 2002); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208,
§ 34D, ch. 209, § 32, ch. 209A, § 5A, 7, ch. 209C, § 15 (Law. Co-op 2001). In 1992,
Massachusetts was the first state to create a computerized database of all domestic violence
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The options for relief that civil protection orders provide are granted
by statute and are often more comprehensive than those available in
criminal and other non-domestic violence orders of protection.35 Civil
protection orders can require the abuser to stay away from the victim, to
refrain from contacting, threatening, harassing, stalking the victim, or
committing acts of violence against her.36 Also, in some states, a judge
issuing a civil protection order can include orders relating to child custody
and visitation.37 They can also require a person restrained to seek
counseling38 and drug or alcohol treatment,39 they can grant the petitioner
possession of the residence or other property,40 child support, or other
economic relief,41 and can keep the petitioner from having access to the
petitioner’s personal information.42
The process for obtaining a civil protection order varies by
jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions a temporary or emergency protection
order, valid for a short time, can be obtained immediately without a full
hearing.43 Often these are granted ex-parte, or without the abuser’s
restraining orders issued within the state. Under Massachusetts law, criminal and civil
record searches are required for each protection order application. Id. Several states have
followed Massachusetts’ lead by improving protection order verification procedures. See,
e.g., Ala. Code § 18.65.540 (2001); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3608 (2000); Cal. Fam. Code.
§ 6380 (Deering 2001); Cal. Penal Code § 13701 (Deering 2001); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6803.7 (2000); Fla. Stat. § 741.30 (2000); La. Rev. Stat. § 46:2136.2 (2000); N.D. Cent.
Code § 12-60-23 (2000); W. Va. Code § 48-24-12(2000); Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-2307 (2000);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.783 (2001); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23-3-39.8 (2000).
35

See discussion infra ftnt --- and text.

36

See e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-5 (Michie 2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102
(2001); Cal. Fam. Code § 6300 (2002).
37

See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2001); Cal. Fam. Code § 6300 (2002); Ka.
Stat. Ann. § 403.740-750 (2003).
38

See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 403.740-750 (2003).

39

See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13.14-102 (2001); Cal. Fam. Code § 6300 (2002).

40

See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-5(A)(1) (Michie 2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3113.31(E)(1)(b) Anderson 2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 403.740-750 (2003).
41

See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 403.740-750 (2003).

42

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950 (West 2003).

43

See e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 403.740; Waul, supra note 6 at 52.
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presence.44 But, to alleviate due process challenges, courts require that an
evidentiary hearing follow the issuance of the temporary order, and the
restrained party must be given notice of the hearing.45 After a hearing, the
court can render the order “permanent,” but this usually means the order
will remain in effect for a distinct amount of time, typically one to two
years.46 Civil rules of procedure apply, including a standard of proof that is
lower than in criminal cases.47 A judge need only determine that the facts
alleged in the petition occurred and that the behavior is likely to continue by
a preponderance of the evidence.48
The punishment for violating a civil protection order varies from
state to state. In most states, violations of protection orders are punishable
at least as misdemeanors.49 Most also provide that a violation of a civil

44

Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered
Women’s Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 227, 230-31 (Eve Buzawa & Carl Buzawa
eds. 1992).
45

Id; Carolyn N. Ko, Note Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The
Unresolved Question of “Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 361, 365 (2002).
46

Waul, supra note 6 at 52. Some states have extended the protection to three years,
see e.g., Kan. Rev. Stat. § 403.750(2) (2003), while others have extended the time to five
years. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 708.12 (2001). Other states, in the context of criminal
protection orders, have made protection orders permanent. See e.g., N.J. Rev. Stat.
§ 2C:12-10.1 (2001) (making protection orders issued in stalking cases permanent unless
sought to be dissolved by the victim); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-40e (2001) (granting
discretion to judges to issue standing criminal restraining orders where they believe such an
order will best serve the interests of the victim and the public.)
47

In criminal cases, an order of protection can only remain in effect if the fact finder
determines that the defendant committed the underlying acts or crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(5) (McKinney 2003).
48

49

Waul, supra note 6 at 52.

Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163
(1993). In New York, for instance, violation of a civil protective order does not constitute
a substantive crime, but can constitute either civil or criminal contempt depending on the
circumstances of the violation. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 215.52 (violation of a “duly
served” order of protection constitutes a class D felony if “he or she intentionally or
recklessly causes physical injury or serious physical injury to a person for whose protection
such order was issued”); see also, N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 846-a (family court has power to
commit respondent to not more than six months jail for willful violation of a civil
protection order).
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protection order is grounds for charges of civil or criminal contempt.50 In
some states, a repeat violator of protection orders can be charged with a
felony,51 and both fines and jail time can be imposed.52 Only a very few
have required a minimum term of confinement for protection order
violations.53 Almost every state has enacted warrantless arrest policies for
those suspected of violating a valid protection order.54
II. THE RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT
To qualify for a domestic violence civil protection order, the person
petitioning must show he or she has a relationship with the respondent.55
As of 1995, the relationship requirement in a majority of states was more
restrictive than it is today. By that year, thirty-three states mandated that

50

Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3,12 (1999)
(discussing the legislature's response to domestic violence); Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer,
supra note 49; Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Protection Orders:
Legislation, Current Court Practice, and Enforcement, (1990). The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a criminal prosecution for conduct that also resulted in a criminal contempt
conviction for violating a protection order did not violate the Constitution’s Double
Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993); People v. Wood, 95
N.Y.2d 509, (2000) (Interpreting N.Y. Crim. Pro. § 40.20 (McKinney 2001)). However,
some state courts have disagreed and have determined that a defendant cannot be
prosecuted both for criminal contempt and criminal charges of protection order violations.
See. e.g., State v. Lessary, 865 P.2d 150, 155 (Haw. 1994) ("we conclude that the
interpretation given to the double jeopardy clause by the United States Supreme Court in
Dixon does not adequately protect individuals from being 'subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy”).
51

See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 720-5/12-30 9 (2001); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07
(Vernon 2000); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.50.110 (2001).
52

Klein & Orloff, supra note 15 at 1095-99.

53

Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 586-11 (2003) (imposing minimum forty-eight hours jail for first
offense, and minimum of thirty days for the second); Iowa Code § 236.14 (2001); 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. § 5/12-30 (2001).
54

Linda G. Mills, Commentaries, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence
of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 558 (1999). However, in New York,
warrantless arrest provisions do not apply to criminal protection orders, and they only
apply to domestic violence orders of protection if the abuser either violates a “stay away”
provision, or commits a new crime. N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 140.10 (McKinney 2003).
55

For a discussion of the relationship requirement as it relates to teens, see Stacy L.
Brustin, Legal Responses to Teen Dating Violence, 29 FAM. L. Q. 331, 339 (1995).
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only individuals who were married, related by blood, had a child in
common with the respondent, or were living together with the respondent,
qualified for civil protection orders.56 Since then, the tide has changed.
Several states have amended their statutes to become more inclusive. In all
fifty states, victims related to their abusers by blood or marriage are
permitted to seek domestic violence orders of protection. The remaining
breakdown of the relationships and the number of states that cover them are
detailed below.57
A. Parents of a Common Child
As of 1993, only forty-one states provided for protection of parents
of a child in common.58 Today, forty-eight states provide protection to

56

Id.; See Ala. Code § 30-5-2(4) (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- 3601(A) (1994);
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103(b) (Michie 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38a(2) (West
1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041(2) (1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.28(2) (West 1995);
Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1(2) (1993); Idaho Code § 396303(2) (1993); Iowa Code § 236.2 (1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3102 (1993); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132(4) (West
1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 762(4) (West 1994); Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4501 (1994); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950a (West 1994); Minn. Stat. Ann.
518B.01(2)(b) (West 1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21- 3(d) (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 455.200 (1994); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903(4) (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018
(Michie 1992); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812(1) (McKinney 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a)
(1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31(A)(3) (Anderson 1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §
60.1(4) (West 1995); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20(b) (Law.Co-op.1976); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 25-10-1(2) (1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(4) (1994); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
71.01(b) (West 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (1990); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1101(2)
(1994); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1- 279.1 (Michie 1994); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102(a)(iv) (1994).
57

A table reflecting the breakdown of states’ treatment of each type of relationship is
attached as Appendix A.
58

See Klein & Orloff, supra note 15 at 825. Alaska Stat. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1993); Cal. Fam. Code S 70 (West 1993); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-4-101 (West Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-15 (West
Supp. 1993); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 945 (1993); D.C. Code Ann. § 16- 1004 (1989); Ga.
Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (Supp. 1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586- 1 (Supp. 1992); Idaho Code §
39-6303 (1993); 750 ILCS 60/103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-5.1-1
(West 1993); Iowa Code Ann. § 236.2 (West Supp. 1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720
(Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 762 (West Supp. 1992); Md.
Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-501 (Supp. 1992); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 209A, § 1 (West
1986); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-3 (Supp.
1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455-010 (Vernon Supp. 1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903 (Supp.
1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-018 (Michie 1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1
(Supp. 1992); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-20 (West 1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13-2 (Michie
Supp. 1992); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 846, 812 (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.D. Cent. Code §
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parents of an existing common child.59 This number includes the states that
do not specifically provide for co-parents, but provide coverage for
members in a dating relationship.60 The two remaining states, Louisiana
and Missouri, do not explicitly include co-parents or members of dating
relationships as persons who may obtain domestic violence protection
orders, but they do include cohabitants.61 Louisiana limits its protection to
14- 07.1-01 (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31 (Anderson 1992); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West 1992); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (1991); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
6102 (1992); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, § 602 (Supp. 1990); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-1 (1988);
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4- 40 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-1
(1986); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-60 (1991); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71-01 (West 1992);
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1993); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-253.1 (Supp. 1993); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.50.120 (West Supp. 1993); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1992);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 813.122 (West Supp. 1993); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102 (Supp. 1993).
59

Ala. Code § 30-5-2 (1975); Alaska Stat. § 25.35.200 (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13- 3601 (2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103 (Michie 2003); Cal. Fam. Code § 6211
(Deering 2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-4-101 (West 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38a
(West 2003); D.C. Law 10- 237 (2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 741.28 (West 2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1
(2003); Idaho Code § 39- 6303 (2003); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 60/103 (Smith-Hurd
2003); Ind. Code § 35-41-1-10.6 (2003); Iowa Code § 236.2 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 603102 (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 2003); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 46:2132 (West 2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A § 4002 (West 2003); Md. Code
Ann., Family Law § 4-501 (2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 1(e) (West 2003); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950 (West 2003); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (West 2003);
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21- 3 (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.200 (2003); Mont. Code Ann. §
40-4- 121 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 (Michie
2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-19 (Lexis 2003);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13- 2 (Michie 2003); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 2003);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3113.31 (Anderson 2003); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. §
107.705 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6102(a) (2003); R.I. Gen Laws § 15-15-1 (2003);
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-1 (2003);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 (2003); Tex. Fam. Code Ann §§ 71.003-006, .0021 (Vernon
2003); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2003); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1101 (2003); Va. Code
Ann. § 16.1-228 (Michie 2003); Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010 (West 2003); W. Va.
Code § 48-27-204 (2003); Wis. Stat. § 813.12(1) (2003); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102 (2003).
60

There are only two states that fit this category: Vermont and Mississippi. Vermont
does not specifically include parents of a common child, but it does include members of a
dating relationship regardless of gender. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1101 (2003). Also, while
Mississippi does not explicitly include parents of a common child, an executive order
declares that “although not falling into the definition of "family or household member", if
the individuals have a biological or legally adopted child between them, the relationship is
also protected.” Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2000-0588, Carrubba, (Oct. 6, 2000).
61

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132(4) (West 2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.200 (2003).
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cohabitants of the opposite sex.62
B. Cohabitation
Today, including the number of states that do not explicitly provide
protection for cohabitants, but do include other romantic relationships,63 all
states but one, New York, provide domestic violence protection orders for
cohabitants.64 All but two states, Delaware and Maryland, provide
protection for both present and former cohabitants.65 Delaware, Louisiana,
However, the fact that both Louisiana and Missouri do not provide protection to all parents
who share a child regardless of their cohabitancy status creates a dangerous gap in the law.
See, Klein & Orloff, supra note 15 at 824-825.
62

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132(4) (West 2003).

63

Indiana, Montana, and West Virginia do not specifically include cohabitants but they
do provide protection to members of a dating relationship. Ind. Code § 35
- 41-1-10.6
(2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (2003); W. Va. Code § 48-27-204 (2003). Of these,
only Montana limits protection to members of the opposite sex. Alabama includes “present
or former household member,” which the courts have interpreted to mean current or former
cohabitants (Haraway v. Phillips, 2002 WL 1728619 (Ala. Civ. Ct. App.2002) (interpreting Ala.
Code § 30-5-2 (2003))
64

Ala. Code § 30-5-2 (2003); Alaska Stat. § 18.66.990 (2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13- 3601 (2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103 (Michie 2003); Cal. Fam. Code § 6211
(Deering 2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14
-4- 101 (West 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38a
(West 2003); D.C. Law 16-1001 (2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 741.28 (West 2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1
(2003); Idaho Code § 39- 6303 (2003); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 60/103 (Smith-Hurd
2003); Ind. Code § 35-41-1-10.6 (2003); Iowa Code § 236.2 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 603102 (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 2003); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 46:2132 (West 2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A § 4002 (West 2003); Md. Code
Ann., Family Law § 4-501 (2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 1(e) (West 2003); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950 (West 2003); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01 (West 2003);
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21- 3 (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.200 (2003); Mont. Code Ann. §§
40-4-121, 45-5-206 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903 (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018
(Michie 2003); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-19 (Lexis
2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-13- 2 (Michie 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (2003); N.D.
Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31 (Anderson 2003); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, §
6102(a) (2003); R.I. Gen Laws § 8-8.1-1 (2003); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op.
2003); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-1 (2003); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 (2003);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann §§ 71.003-006, .0021 (Vernon 2003); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1
(2003); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1101 (2003); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228 (Michie 2003);
Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010 (West 2003); W. Va. Code § 48
- 27-204 (2003); Wis.
Stat. § 813.12(1) (2003); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102 (2003)
65

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003); Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-501 (2003).
Other states such as Rhode Island limit protection to those who were cohabitants within a
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Montana, North Carolina, and South Carolina, limit protection to
cohabitants of the opposite sex.66
C. Dating, Sexual and/or Intimate Relationships
By 1995, only fifteen states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands, authorized individuals in dating relationships
to obtain domestic violence civil protection orders.67 Today, a total of
thirty-five states provide protection to members of some form of dating
relationship.68 Some states require that the relationship be sexual in order

certain time. See, R.I. § 8-8.1-1 (2003) ("’Cohabitants’" means emancipated minors or
persons eighteen (18) years of age or older, not related by blood or marriage, who together
are not the legal parents of one or more children, and who have resided together within the
preceding three (3) years or who are residing in the same living quarters.”)
66

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041(2)(b) (2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132 (West
2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (2003); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003).
Montana does not specifically provide for the protection of cohabitants, but does provide
protection for members of the opposite sex in a “dating or ongoing romantic relationship.”
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-4-121, 45-5-206 (2003).
67

Brustin, supra note 55 at 340; Alaska Stat. § 25.35.200(4) (1994); Cal. Fam. Code §
6211(c) (Deering 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-4-101 (West 1994); D.C. Law 10- 237
(1995); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 60/103(6) (Smith-Hurd 1994); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
209A, § 1(e) (West 1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4- 121(13)(c) (1993); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 173-B:1(IV) (1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-19(d) (Lexis 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40-13- 2(D) (Michie 1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01(4) (1993); Or. Rev. Stat. §
107.705(2)(e) (1993); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6102(a) (1991); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, §§
602(i), (k) (1990); R.I. Gen Laws § 15-15-1(5) (1994); V.I.Code Ann. 16, § 91(c) (1994);
Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010(2) (West 1994); W.Va. Code § 48-2A-2(b) (1994).
68

Alaska Stat. § 18.66.990 (2003); Cal. Fam. Code § 6211(c) (Deering 2003); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 14-4-101 (West 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38a(2) (2003) (“dating
relationship”); D.C. Law 16-1001 (2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1(2) (2003) (“dating
relationship” means a “romantic, courtship, or engagement relationship, often but not
necessarily characterized by actions of an intimate or sexual nature”); Idaho Code § 396303(2) (2003) (“dating relationship”); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 60/103 (Smith-Hurd
2003); Iowa Code § 236.2(e) (includes those who are or were in an “intimate relationship”
and have had contact within the past year; court is to consider a nonexclusive list of factors,
including expectation by either party of sexual or romantic involvement); Ind. Code § 35
41-1-10.6(2)-(3) (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3102 (2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A
§ 4002(4) (West 2003); (“family or household members,” which includes individuals who
are or were sexual partners.”); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 1(e) (West 2003); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950(30)(a) (West 2003) (“dating relationship means frequent,
intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional
involvement.”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01(2)(b) (“significant romantic or sexual
relationship”: “In determining whether persons are or have been involved in a significant
romantic or sexual relationship . . . the court shall consider the length of time of the
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for the participants to receive protection,69 but most merely require
something more than a platonic relationship.70 Also, most states that offer
the protection to members of dating relationships offer it without regard to
the age of the relationship members.71 However, some limit the protection

relationship; type of relationship; frequency of interaction between the parties; and, if the
relationship has terminated, length of time since the termination); Miss. Code Ann. § 9321- 3(d) (2003) (includes family or household members who reside together or who
formerly resided together or between individuals who have a “current dating relationship,”
which is defined to mean a “social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature”); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 455.010 (2003) (“or has been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic
or intimate nature with the victim”); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-4-121, 45-5-206 (2003); Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 (“"dating relationship" means frequent, intimate associations
primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional or sexual involvement.”); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-19 (Lexis 2003); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 40-13- 2 (Michie 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a) (persons of the opposite sex
who are in a “dating relationship or have been in a dating relationship. For purposes of this
subdivision, a dating relationship is one wherein the parties are romantically involved over
time and on a continuous basis during the course of the relationship.”); N.D. Cent. Code §
14-07.1-01 (2003); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 60.1(4) (2003) (“dating relationship”); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6102(a) (2003); R.I. Gen Laws §§ 15
15-1, 8-8.1-1 (2003); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(4) (dating and sexual relationships);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann § 71.0021(b) (Vernon 2003) (“dating relationship.”); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 1101(2) (2003) (sexual and dating relationships. "’Dating’" means a social
relationship of a romantic nature. Factors that the court may consider when determining
whether a dating relationship exists or existed include: (A) the nature of the relationship;
(B) the length of time the relationship has existed; (C) the frequency of interaction between
the parties; (D) the length of time since the relationship was terminated, if applicable.”);
Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010 (West 2003); W. Va. Code § 48-27-204(3), (4) (2003)
(sexual or intimate partners or dating); Wis. Stat. § 813.12(1); Wyo. Stat. § 35-21102(a)(iv) (2003) (are or were in “dating relationship”).
69

See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A § 4002 (West 2003) (“are or were “Sexual
partners”; Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2003) (“Persons who have been involved in a sexually
intimate relationship with each other within two years immediately preceding the filing”).
70

See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-1(2) (2003) (“’dating relationship’” does not include
a casual acquaintanceship or ordinary fraternization between persons in a business or social
context.”); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 (“"dating relationship" . . . does not include a
casual relationship or an ordinary association between persons in a business or social
context”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a) (“A casual acquaintance or ordinary fraternization
between persons in a business or social context is not a dating relationship”).
71

See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-4-101 (West 2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3102
(2003) (includes “intimate partners and household members,” which includes those in a
“dating relationship” to be determined by a list of factors); Ind. Code § 35-41-1-10.6(2)-(3)
(2003) (is dating or has dated the other person; is or was engaged in a sexual relationship
with the other person);
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to adult members only.72 Others specifically offer protection to both minors
and adults.73 Of these states, two limit protection to members of a current
relationship.74 Two others require that the relationship occurred within a
certain amount of time.75
D. Pregnancy
Three states, Arizona, Minnesota, and Utah, specifically allow victims
who are pregnant with the respondent’s child to obtain domestic violence
civil protection orders.76 Most victims would be entitled to protection under
the dating relationship protection offered in Minnesota and thirty three other
states.77 However, in states like New York where the jurisdiction of the

72

See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 813.12(1) ("Dating relationship" means a romantic or intimate
social relationship between two adult individuals); Wash Rev. Code. Ann. § 26.50.010
(West 2003) (“persons sixteen years of age or older with whom a person sixteen years of
age or older has or has had a dating relationship”).
73

See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-15-1 (2003) (“persons who are or have been in a
substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year in which at least one
of the persons is a minor”) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8.1-1 (2003) (“persons who are or have
been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one year”).
74

Mississippi and North Dakota limit protection to members of a current dating
relationship. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21- 3 (2003) (“individuals who have a current dating
relationship”); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 (2003) (“persons who are in a dating
relationship”). But, North Dakota includes in its statute a catch-all provision, which
provides domestic violence protection orders to “any other person with a sufficient
relationship to the abusing person as determined by the court.” Id.
75

Rhode Island requires that the relationship occurred within one year, and Oregon
limits coverage to relationships within the last two years. R.I. Gen Laws §§ 15-15-1, 8-8.11 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2003).
76

See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- 3601(A) (2003); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 518B.01(2)(b) (2003) (Minnesota also amended its statute to allow victims in dating
relationships to obtain civil orders of protection); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2003). For a
discussion of pregnancy and domestic violence See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, WOMEN
AT RISK: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WOMEN'S HEALTH (1996); Hortensa Amaro et al.,
Violence During Pregnancy and Substance Abuse, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 575-79 (1990);
and Judith McFarlane et al., Assessing Abuse During Pregnancy: Severity and Frequency
of Injuries and Associated Entry into Prenatal Care, 267 JAMA 3176-78 (1992).
77

However, many states do not provide protection for pregnant victims, which creates
another dangerous gap in the law. Klein and Orloff have suggested that “the most effective
way to address these dangerous oversights in the statutes and extend civil protection order
coverage to abuse victims, whether they have a child in common with the respondent,
claim to have a child in common, or are presently pregnant with the respondent's child, is

20

Judith A. Smith

15-Apr-04

courts to provide civil protection orders is limited, women who are pregnant
with their abusers’ children are denied protection.78
E. Same Sex Relationships
As of 1993, ten states, Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, specifically denied protection to couples in same sex
relationships.79 Several other states had statutes open to interpretation.80
Today, that number has been cut in half. Five states specifically limit

to . . . cover dating relationships and all intimate partners. Such statutory changes will
result in the ability to more fully reach those relationships in which violence occurs, and
will prevent victims of abuse from falling dangerously through statutory cracks.” Klein
and Orloff supra note 15 at 828-29. But, it may be better yet to omit the relationship
requirement and extend the availability of civil protection orders to anyone in reasonable
fear of another.
78

See, e.g., Gina C v. Stephen F., 576 N.Y.S.2d 776, 776 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991)
(Unborn child was not "child" within meaning of statute conferring jurisdiction for family
offense proceedings on family court if parties have child in common; thus, family court had
no jurisdiction over mother's petition for protection order against father who was not living
with her). Robert F.Z. v. Michelle McG, 513 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.) (family court
lacked jurisdiction in case of putative father who denied paternity of unborn child and
pregnant mother). In Gina, the court recommended the definition be changed to include
pregnant mothers: “The legislature unfortunately has not extended Article 8 protection to
situations where the sole connection between two unmarried, non-cohabitating individuals
is an unborn child. Petitioner's only remedy in this matter is to apply to the criminal courts
for protection and redress. The Court calls upon the legislature to remedy this gap in
Article 8 and confer upon the Family Court jurisdiction to provide protection from
domestic violence to pregnant women who find themselves in this situation.” See e.g.,
Gina C. v. Stephen F., 576 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991); but see, Gloria C. v.
William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (granting protection order on behalf of
fetus against abuse by mother’s husband).
79

Ala. Code § 30-5-2(4) (1989); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601B (1992); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 10, §§ 901(9), 1041 (Supp. 1992); Fl. Rev. Stat. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1993);
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-3 (Supp. 1992); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.010 (1992); Mont. Code
Ann. § 45-5-206 (1991); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (1989); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 6102(a)
(1991); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); see also, Hon. Mac D. Hunter,
Homosexuals as a New Class of Domestic Violence Subjects under the New Jersey
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, 31 U. LOUIS. J. FAM. L. 557, 573
(1992/1993).
80

See e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (“member of
an unmarried couple); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132(4) (West 1993) (living as spouses);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2950a (West 1992); R.I. Gen Laws § 15-15-1 (1988 &
Supp. 1992) (same).
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protection to persons in relationships with someone of the opposite sex in
some way.81 Delaware and North Carolina specifically limit protection of
co-parents and cohabitants to heterosexual couples.82 Louisiana and South
Carolina limit coverage of cohabitants to opposite-sex couples.83 But,
South Carolina does not specifically exclude members of same-sex
relationships if they share a child; Louisiana does not have a co-parent
provision.84 Like South Carolina, Montana limits coverage to members of
opposite-sex dating relationships, but does not place the same restriction on
co-parents; however, Montana does not specifically provide protection to
cohabitants, regardless of their respective gender.85
Until 2000, many states still did not provide coverage to couples in
dating relationships, provided coverage to cohabitating couples living “as
spouses,”86 or had other statutory ambiguities that brought their coverage of
same sex couples into question.87 Since then, with the exception of five, all
such states have either added coverage to dating couples regardless of their

81

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132 (West 2003);
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(b)(2),(6) (2003); S.C. Code
Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003.
82

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041 (2003) (“domestic violence” is limited to “a man and
a woman co-habitating together with or without a child of either or both, or a man and a
woman living separate and apart with a child in common”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B1(b)(2),(6) (2003) (“personal relationship” includes “persons of opposite sex who live
together or have lived together” and “are persons of the opposite sex who are in a dating
relationship or have been in a dating relationship”).
83

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2132 (West 2003) (“"Household members" means any
person of the opposite sex presently or formerly living in the same residence with the
defendant as a spouse, whether married or not”); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (Law. Co-op.
2003) (“Household member" means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons
related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, persons who have a child in
common, and a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited”).
84

Id.

85

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-206 (2003) (“’Partners’" means spouses, former spouses,
persons who have a child in common, and persons who have been or are currently in a
dating or ongoing intimate relationship with a person of the opposite sex”).
86

See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31(A)(3) (Anderson 1993) ("Family or
household member" only includes “a spouse, a person living as a spouse, or a former
spouse of the respondent”).
87

See e.g., supra note 80.
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respective genders, or their courts have interpreted the statute as applying to
same-sex couples.88
F. No Relationship Requirement
A few states have also removed a relationship requirement altogether.
They allow anyone to obtain the same type of protection that domestic
violence protection orders provide without regard to relationship. Typically,
they only require that the petitioner show she is in reasonable fear of
imminent harm by the respondent.89
G. Summary
In ten years, the coverage of domestic violence civil protection
orders has increased dramatically. States offering protection to members of
dating relationships has more than tripled.90 Only thirteen states still restrict
coverage of domestic violence civil protection orders to those who are or
were married or related to their abuser, share a child with him, or who are or
were living with him.91 Two more states, Arizona, and Utah have amended

State v. Yaden, 692 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding gay man was “a
person living as a spouse” with his partner and was a “family or household member” for
purposes of the domestic violence statute); Ireland v. Davis, 957 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding homosexual couple fit definition of “couple” for purposes of a
domestic violence protection order).
88

89

See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102(4)(a); Ariz. Rev. Stat.. § 12-1809 (allowing
“any person” to obtain an injunction against another for acts of harassment); Cal. Code Civ.
P. § 527.6 (allowing any “person” to obtain an injunction against another for "harassment,"
which is defined as unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence . . . that seriously
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. "Credible
threat of violence" is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would
place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate
family, and that serves no legitimate purpose”).
90

In 1993, only ten states offered protection to members of dating relationships.
Alaska Stat. § 25.35.200 (Supp. 1993); Cal. Fam. Code § 70 (West Supp. 1992); Mass.
Gen. L. Ann. ch. 209A, § 1 (West 1992); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (Supp. 1992);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40- 13-2 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 14.07.1-01 (Supp.
1993); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6102 (1992); R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8.1-1 (Supp. 1992)
('persons who shared an intimate sexual relationship within the past six (6) months'); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.50.010(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1993); W. Va. Code § 48-2A-2 (Supp.
1993); See Klein & Orloff supra note 15 at 836.
91

Ala. Code § 30-5-2(4) (2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13- 3601(A) (2003); Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-15-103(b) (Michie 2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1041(2) (2003); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 741.28(2) (West 2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 403.720 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 2003); Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-501 (2003);
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their statutes to allow victims who are pregnant with the respondent’s child
to petition for protection orders.92 The remaining states, save one, also
permit victims who are dating their abuser to obtain civil protection
orders.93
In those states where the parties fall outside the states’ relationship
definitions, victims are unable to obtain a domestic violence civil protection
order. In these situations, an individual must rely on criminal courts, or they
must rely on the creativity of the courts to obtain protection.94 This can be a
difficult and expensive procedure and the remedies available under civil
protection order statutes may not be available in another context. Also,
reliance on the criminal system may be insufficient; evidence to sustain
proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be lacking, or the government may
simply be unwilling to proceed with a case.
III. ALTERNATE PATHS: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ORDERS OF PROTECTION IN
NEW YORK
Unless she is obtaining a divorce, the only two places a victim of
domestic violence can get protective relief in New York State are in family
court and criminal court.95 So, the only place a victim can obtain a civil
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903(4) (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31(A)(3) (2003); S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-4-20(b) (Law.Co-op. 2003); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 25-10-1(2)
(2003); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2003).
92

See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601(A) (2003); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 518B.01(2)(b) (2003) (Minnesota also amended its statute to allow victims in dating
relationships to obtain civil orders of protection); Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2003). For a
discussion of pregnancy and domestic violence See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, WOMEN
AT RISK: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WOMEN'S HEALTH (1996); Hortensa Amaro et al.,
Violence During Pregnancy and Substance Abuse, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 575-79 (1990);
and Judith McFarlane et al., Assessing Abuse During Pregnancy: Severity and Frequency
of Injuries and Associated Entry into Prenatal Care, 267 JAMA 3176-78 (1992).
93

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

94

Brustin, supra note 55 at 338; Courts have used creative means to protect victims of
domestic violence where they do not satisfy statutory definitions. For example, before the
statute was amended to cover dating relationships, a court in Wisconsin used a state
harassment statute to protect a member of dating relationship. Banks v. Pelot, 460 N.W.2d
446 (Wis. Ct. App.1990).
95

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11-13; N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 842; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§§ 240(3); 252 (McKinney 2003). New York does not provide for a person to obtain any
civil protection order in a general civil court. While beyond the scope of this article, it is
notable that all other crime victims have no civil remedy to obtain an order of protection.
The only way for such a victim in New York to obtain protection from harm is to file a
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order of protection is to seek relief in family court. But, a person can obtain
a civil order in family court only if she falls within the intersection of two
separate inquiries: was she a victim of a “family offense,” and was that
offense committed by a member of her “family or household.” If she fails
to meet either of these inquiries, she is barred entirely from obtaining civil
protection.
The intersection of these two inquiries exists in New York’s
criminal system as well. In New York, all victims of crime are entitled to a
criminal order of protection, which can be obtained from criminal court
once a defendant is arrested and charged with a crime. But, there are two
different types of criminal orders: “family offense” criminal orders of
protection, and standard criminal orders of protection. The family offense
orders offer additional unique benefits that the standard orders do not. Like
the inquiries in family court, to obtain a family offense criminal order, the
criminal court inquires whether the victim is both a victim of a “family
offense,” and a member of the defendant’s “family or household” as defined
in the Family Court Act.
As a result, New York has a “bifurcated” system, and one of the
most difficult systems to navigate in the country. It treats victims
differently based on their relationships with the abusers and based on the
crimes the abusers committed against them. This article focuses on the
problems with this bifurcated system. It takes issue both with its definition
of “family offense” and with its definition of “family or household
member.” Such a system does not provide sufficient protection because it
denies civil protection entirely to one group, and only provides partial
protection to the other.
The next section briefly examines the procedures and remedies
complaint in Criminal Court. While the court has the discretion to issue an order of
protection based on a victim’s complaint that the defendant committed a crime as defined
by New York’s penal law, the discretion ultimately lies with the prosecutor as to whether
or not to pursue the criminal charges, and a criminal order of protection will only remain in
place if the defendant is convicted of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. N.Y. Crim. P.
L. 530.12(14) (McKinney 2003). This seems particularly troubling for victims of certain
crimes such as sex assault, stalking, and other violent crime. This may be especially true
for crimes where proof may not be strong enough to sustain a criminal case, but would pass
a lower burden. Some states have made efforts to provide civil orders of protections
specific to sex assault victims, while others provide protection to any persons so long as
imminent danger exists, or where a person is in reasonable fear of another. See infra, note
182; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2003) (permitting any municipal court, county court, or
district court to issue civil orders of protection to a person whose health or safety is in
“imminent danger” from another, but a lapse of time between an act of abuse or threat and
filing of the petition is not dispositive).
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available to two separate sets of victims: those who are entitled to
jurisdiction in family court because they were a victim of a “family offense”
by a member of the same family or household, and those who are not
entitled to jurisdiction in family court because they do not satisfy one or
both of those definitions. It will examine the procedures and benefits of the
civil order of protection as well as the “family offense” and standard
criminal orders of protection.
A. Victims entitled to jurisdiction in family court
Only a victim who can show she was a victim of a ‘family offense”
at the hands of a member of the same “family or household” is entitled to
jurisdiction in family court. These victims are entitled both to civil orders
of protection in family court and, if criminal charges are pending, to “family
offense” orders of protection in criminal court. “Family offenses” include
the following crimes, which are in turn defined by New York Penal law96:
disorderly conduct,97 harassment in the first98 and second degree,99
aggravated harassment in the second degree100, menacing in the second101
and third degree,102 reckless endangerment,103 assault in the second104 and
third degree105, attempted assault,106 stalking in the first,107 second,108

96

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812; N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 511.11 (McKinney 2003).

97

However, disorderly conduct is not limited to public conduct, but also includes
disorderly conduct not in a public place. Id. Disorderly conduct is defined in N.Y. Penal
Law § 240.20 (McKinney 2001).
98

N.Y. Penal Law § 240.25 (McKinney 2001).

99

N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26 (McKinney 2001).

100

N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30 (McKinney 2001).

101

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14 (McKinney 2001).

102

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.15 (McKinney 2001).

103

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.20-.25 (McKinney 2001).

104

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05 (McKinney 2001).

105

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00 (McKinney 2001).

106

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.15 (McKinney 2001).

107

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.60 (McKinney 2001).

26

Judith A. Smith

15-Apr-04

third,109 and fourth110 degree. “Members of the same family or household”
include “persons related by consanguinity or affinity; persons legally
married to one another; persons formerly married to one another; and
persons who have a child in common regardless whether such persons have
been married or have lived together at any time.” 111
1. Civil Orders of Protection in Family Court
A victim must file a petition in family court to obtain a civil order of
protection. She must show that the respondent engaged in conduct that
constituted one of the delineated offenses, and must show that she is a
member of the same family or household by showing she is a spouse,
former spouse, parent, child, or that she shares a child with the
respondent.112
If the abuser commits a crime other than one of the delineated
“family offenses,” such as a sex crime, first degree assault, kidnapping,
criminal mischief, etc., she can seek neither a civil order of protection, nor a
“family offense” criminal order of protection even if she is married to the
abuser, has children with him, or is otherwise a “family or household”
member of the abuser’s. Her only remedy in such a situation is to proceed
in criminal court, and to obtain a “non family offense” criminal order of
protection.113
A victim may obtain a temporary order of protection, which, after a
final hearing, can be made “permanent.”114 The court can require the abuser
to do the following: stay away from the home, school, business, or place of

108

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.55 (McKinney 2001).

109

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.50 (McKinney 2001).

110

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney 2001).

111

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812; N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11 (McKinney 2003).

112

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 821 (McKinney 2001).

113

See infra section C.2.

114

Once issued, a “permanent” order remains in place for two years unless aggravating
circumstances are present. If such circumstances are present, an order will remain in place
for five years. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 842 (McKinney 2001). Aggravating circumstances
include the following: physical injury; the use of a dangerous instrument; a history of
repeated violations; prior convictions for crimes against the petitioner; or “like incidents.”
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 828(3) (McKinney 2001).

15-Apr-04]

A Call for Reform

27

employment of any other party; permit a parent entitled to visitation by an
existing order to visit the child; to permit a party to enter the residence to
remove personal belongings; to refrain from committing a family offense,
or any criminal offense against the child or against the other parent or
against any person to whom custody is awarded, or from harassing
intimidating or threatening such persons;115 to refrain from acts creating an
unreasonable risk to health, safety or welfare of a child;116 to pay counsel
and other fees in connection with the petition; to require the abuser to
participate in a batterer’s education program, which may include drug and
alcohol counseling; to provide medical care or pay for expenses; and to
observe “other conditions as are necessary to further the purposes of
protection.”117 The order can also include provisions for child support,
custody and visitation, and provisions revoking any existing license to
posses a gun.118
If the abuser violates the order, the victim has a few choices. First,
she could call the police. A police officer is required to arrest where an
officer has probable cause to believe that an abuser has committed a felony
against a “family or household member, regardless of whether an order of
protection is in place.”119 An officer is also required to arrest if there is

115

While the Family Court Act usually allows for additional provisions not delineated
in the statute relating to orders of protection in criminal court, the parallel provision in
criminal court reads: “to refrain from committing a family offense . . . or any criminal
offense against the child or against the family or household member, or against any person
to who custody of the child is awarded, or from harassing, intimidating or threatening such
persons. N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.12(c) (McKinney 2003). This seems to provide an
additional protection to victims in criminal court that is not explicitly available in family
court. As a result, while married or formerly married victims who do not share a child with
the abuser are entitled to protection in criminal court from any crime as well as acts of
harassment, intimidation or threats, in family court, they are entitled only to protection
from future family offenses.
116

This provision is similar to the last. The parallel provision in criminal court reads:
“to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the
health, safety and welfare of a child, family or household member’s life or health.” N.Y.
Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(a)(d) (McKinney). Once again, this seems to provide an
additional protection to victims in criminal court that is not explicitly available in family
court.
117

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 842(1) (McKinney 2003).

118

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 828(4), § 842-a (McKinney 2001).

119

N.Y. Crim. P. 140.10(4)(a) (McKinney 2003). Also outside the context of
protection orders, an officer has discretion to arrest an abuser if he has reasonable cause to
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probable cause to believe that an abuser has violated the provisions of a
valid order of a family offense order of protection.120 A police officer must
also arrest if a duly served order of protection includes a “stay away”
provision that the abuser violated, or where the abuser commits another
“family offense” against the family or household member.121 The
provisions relating to an officer’s ability to arrest without a warrant where
an abuser violates the provisions of an order of protection apply only to
“family offense” orders of protection issued in family or criminal court.
They do not apply to orders of protection issued in criminal court to victims
of crime who are not members of the abusers “family or household.”122
But, immediate arrest is not a victim’s only option. She can also
return to family court to file a civil “violation of court order” petition, or
contempt petition.123 If the violation also constituted a “family offense,”
she can initiate an entirely new family offense proceeding in family

believe the abuser has committed a misdemeanor “family offense” against a family or
household member, but the officer is directed to determine the primary aggressor, and is to
avoid dual arrests. Also, if an abuser commits a misdemeanor family offense against a
family or household member, and the officer elects not to arrest, the officer is required to
make a report of investigation on a standardized form that the police department must keep
on file for four years following the incident that lead to the investigation. Id. This
procedure is not required if the victim is not one of a “family offense,” and is not a “family
or household member” of the abusers. Id. For a discussion of the wisdom of mandatory
arrest policies, compare Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550 (1999) (arguing that mandatory
intervention inflicts its own form of violence on victims, that it ignores a victim’s
perspective, and works to rob a victim of even more power); Erin L. Han, note Mandatory
Arrest and No Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L. J. 159, 179-181 (2003) (arguing that mandatory arrest policies can be
parallel with the goal of empowering victims).
120

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 168(1) (McKinney 2003).

121

N.Y. Crim. P. § 140.10(4)(b) (McKinney 2003).

122

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 140.10(4)(b) (McKinney 2003).

123

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 846-a (McKinney 2001). At a contempt hearing in family
court, the court need only be “satisfied by competent proof” that the abuser violated the
order’s terms. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 846-a (McKinney 2003). Upon a finding that the
abuser willfully failed to obey a court order, the family court may modify the order, issue a
new order, order the forfeiture of bail, order payment of reasonable counsel fees, require
the respondent surrender any guns, and commit respondent to jail for up to six months for
each violation. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 847 (McKinney 2003).
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court.124 Or, if she chooses, she can ask the district attorney to file a
complaint in criminal court instead of, or as well as, filing a complaint in
family court.125 Finally, she can also ask the district attorney to file a
complaint for criminal contempt,126 or ask the court to invoke its own
powers to punish for contempt.127 Essentially, the victim has the option of
treating the violation as a new criminal offense, a civil contempt
proceeding, a criminal contempt proceeding, or all three.128
2. Criminal Orders of Protection: “Protection for victims of Family
offenses”
New York has two separate criminal protection order statutes: one
entitled the “protection for victims of “family offenses,”129 and one entitled
“offenses other than family offenses,“130
A victim of a “family offense” at the hands of a member of her
“family or household” has the right to proceed “directly and without court
referral in either a criminal or family court, or both.”131 Simultaneous or
subsequent cases may proceed in both places. To obtain a “family offense”
order of protection in criminal court, a victim must show she is a victim of
124

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 847 (McKinney 2003).

125

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 847

126

See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 215.50 – 215.51 (McKinney 2003). Repeat violations of
family offense orders of protection results in increased penalties for criminal contempt.
Where a defendant has been convicted of contempt within the previous five years and
violates a “family offense” order of protection issued either by family or criminal court, the
misdemeanor contempt crime is elevated to a class “E” felony. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51
(McKinney 2003). This same provision does not apply to non family orders of protection.
127

N.Y. Jud. Law § 750, 751 (McKinney 2003). These powers are separate from
criminal contempt charges. The court has the power to impose prison for up to three
months, and can impose a fine for one thousand dollars; these contempt penalties should
not reduce any sentence for any original offense of which the defendant is also found
guilty. N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 512(10) (McKinney 2003).
128

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 847 (McKinney 2003). However, there may be concerns of
double jeopardy where identical contempt proceedings are pursued in both family and
criminal court. U.S. v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
129

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12 (McKinney 2003).

130

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13 (McKinney 2003).

131

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11(2)(i) (McKinney 2003).
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one of the delineated family offenses at the hands of someone from her
same family or household.
Like civil orders of protection, if an abuser commits a crime that is
not included in the relatively short list of “family offenses,” her remedy is
to seek a “non family offense” order of protection in criminal court. Such
orders do not provide the same levels of protection or provisions as family
offense orders of protection.
If she is a victim of crime by a family or household member, she
may file a complaint with the criminal court, with the police, or with the
prosecutor’s office alleging that a defendant has committed a “family
offense.”132 But, the victim is not in charge of this proceeding. Instead, it is
only the police or prosecutor’s office that may investigate, file charges and
arrest the abuser.133 The prosecutor may decide not to proceed with the case
and has discretion to dismiss the case.134
In connection with the criminal case, the prosecutor may request that
the court may issue an order of protection.135 The order will be in effect
while the prosecution is pending, and for the period during which a case is
adjourned pending dismissal.136

132

See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 100.15 (McKinney 2003). This statute allows any
person having knowledge of the commission of the offense charged to file an information
with the court. However, only district attorneys "retain the ultimate nondelegable
responsibility for prosecuting all crimes and offenses." People v. Soddano, 665 N.E.2d
161 (N.Y. 1995) But see, People v. Van Sickle, 192 N.E.2d 9 (N.Y. 1963) (upholding
conviction led by a lay complainant). To constitute a complaint sufficient for arrest, a
complaint must establish reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. To
constitute a sufficient information, it must also contain non-hearsay evidentiary allegations
to establish every element of the offense alleged. See N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 100.40. While
this procedure is available for victims, it is rarely used. Instead, the victim typically files a
complaint with the police. Interview with Andrew Seewald, Assistant District Attorney,
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office (Oct. 6, 2003).
133

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 120.10-.90 (McKinney 2003).

134

The decision is always the government’s as to whether and how to proceed with a
criminal action. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.12(14) (“The people shall make
reasonable efforts to notify the complainant alleging a crime constituting a family offense
when the people have decided to decline prosecution of such crime, to dismiss the criminal
charges against the defendant or to enter into a plea agreement.”)
135

136

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12 (McKinney 2003).

Unlike other offenses, the time for adjournment of “family offenses” contemplating
dismissal is one year instead of the standard six months for other types of offenses. N.Y.
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The terms of the order can include any or all of the following: orders
for the defendant to stay away from the victim; orders enforcing an existing
child visitation order; orders restraining the defendant from committing any
family offense, any crime against a family or household member, or any
harassing, intimidating or threatening acts against such persons;137 orders
restraining the defendant from committing acts creating an unreasonable
risk to the health safety or welfare of a child or family or household
member; orders to allow a party to enter the shared residence to obtain
belongings;138 and orders that the defendant surrender licenses to carry or
posses guns, and the guns themselves.139
In contrast to family court civil orders of protection, the criminal
court does not have jurisdiction to enter new orders regarding child custody,
support, or visitation, and there are no specific provisions for restitution,
payment of counsel and other fees, probation before conviction, medical
care expenses, batterer intervention programs, or drug and alcohol
counseling.140
Unlike proceedings in family court, which require only proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, to remain in place, a “permanent” criminal
order of protection can only be issued if the underlying crime is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.141
If a defendant violates a “family offense” criminal order of
Crim. P. Law § 170.55(2) (McKinney 2003).
137

N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.11

138

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(a-e). The court may also issue a temporary
protection order ex parte upon the filing of a criminal complaint and for good cause shown.
§ 530.12(3).
139

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.14 (McKinney 2003).

140

Compare N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(a-e) with N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 842(1)(a-i)
(McKinney 2003).
141

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(5). However, to enter the order, the court must state
on the record the reasons for issuing or not issuing an order of protection. Id. Upon
conviction, if the court decides to keep the protection order in place, it must fix the order’s
time of duration. In felony actions, the order can remain in effect for up to five years from
the date of conviction, or three years from the date of the expiration of the maximum term
of an indeterminate sentence or the term of a determinate sentence of imprisonment
actually imposed. Id. For misdemeanor actions, the duration cannot exceed three years
from the date of conviction. Id. In other offenses, the duration of the order cannot exceed
one year from the conviction’s date. Id.
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protection, the victim here also has several options. First, she can call the
police. Like violations of civil orders of protection, police officers have the
authority to arrest for violations of family offense criminal orders of
protection without a warrant, and in some circumstances are required to do
so.142
Second, if an abuser commits another family offense in violation of
the criminal order of protection, the victim has the option of proceeding in
family court, criminal court, or both. She may file a new family offense
proceeding in family court and obtain a new civil order of protection. Or,
just like in violations of civil orders of protection, she may file civil
contempt proceedings in family court.143 She may also request that the
prosecutor file criminal contempt charges, that the court invoke its criminal
contempt penalty powers,144 or that the court to exercise its powers under
the criminal order of protection statute.
B. Procedures for all other victims: the standard criminal order of
protection
A victim of a crime other than a “family offense” is barred from
protection in civil court, and is barred from seeking a family offense order
of protection in criminal court. The only remedy such victims have is to
obtain a standard criminal protection order in criminal court.145 Unlike
family offense victims, victims entitled to protection for other offenses are
not limited by the nature of the crime that the defendant committed; they
can receive an order of protection for any “pending” criminal action.146
Other than the entitlement definitions, the procedure for obtaining a
standard order of protection is identical to the family offense criminal
orders. A victim may file a complaint alleging that a defendant has
committed a crime.147 But, again, the victim is not in charge of this
proceeding. The prosecutor may decide not to proceed with the case and
has discretion to dismiss the case.

142

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 140.10 (McKinney 2003).

143

See supra note 123 and accompanying text.

144

See supra note 126 and accompanying text.

145

N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.13. (McKinney 2003).

146

Id.

147

See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 100.15 (McKinney 2003).
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Like family offense protection orders, the court can issue a
temporary order of protection ex parte without waiting for the abuser’s
arrest and, upon a showing of good cause, the court can issue the order as
soon as the accusatory instrument is filed.148 Temporary orders can also be
issued at other times throughout the proceeding, including when the matter
is adjourned in contemplation of dismissal.149 The order will be in effect
while the prosecution is pending, and for the period during which a case is
adjourned pending dismissal.150
The terms of a standard criminal order of protection are even more
limited than “family offense” criminal orders of protection. The only
remedies specifically sanctioned by statute are “stay away” orders, and
orders restraining the defendant from “harassing, intimidating, threatening
or otherwise interfering with the victim or victims of the offense and such
members of the family or household of such victim.”151 The court can also
include orders restraining the defendant from buying or owning guns.152
But, there are no provisions for restitution, payment of medical expenses,
provisions requiring a party access to personal belongings, provisions
providing for probation before conviction, batterer intervention programs,
or drug and alcohol counseling.153
Even more problematic, however, a victim of a crime other than a
“family offense” may share a child with the defendant. The standard order
of protection does not specifically allow for orders enforcing existing
visitation orders or for restraining the defendant from committing acts
creating an unreasonable risk to the health safety or welfare of a child.154

148

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13(2) (McKinney 2003).

149

N.Y. Crim. P. Law §§ 170.55(3)-(4), 530.12(1) (McKinney 2003).

150

But, unlike a “family offense” case where the time for adjournment contemplating
dismissal is one year, the time for all other crimes is six months. N.Y. Crim. P. Law
§ 170.55(2) (McKinney 2003).
151

N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.13.

152

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.14.

153

Compare N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(a-e) and N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 842
(McKinney 2003).
154

Compare N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.12(1)(b), (d). The court may also issue a
temporary protection order ex parte upon the filing of a criminal complaint and for good
cause shown. § 530.12(3).
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While the court has authority to issue “other conditions,” it is usually
unwilling to depart too far from the delineated provisions. Also, it does not
have jurisdiction to issue orders regarding child custody or visitation.
Additionally, the court uses pre-printed forms and may not take the time to
become adequately informed about the circumstances of the parties because
it does not involve a “family offense.” 155
For a standard order to remain “permanent,” and assuming the
defendant does not plead guilty, a defendant must be convicted of the
underlying charge by proof proved beyond a reasonable doubt.156 But,
unlike a victim of a “family offense,” who has the option of proceeding also
in family court, a victim of any other crime has no alternative or additional
means of protection.157
Where a defendant violates a standard criminal order of protection,
the victim can call the police. But, unlike family offense order violations
that mandate arrest and arrest without a warrant, whether police can arrest
without a warrant a defendant who violates a standard order is unclear.158
The victim may also request that the prosecutor file criminal contempt

155

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812(4) (McKinney 2003)(requiring the chief administrator of
the courts to “prescribe an appropriate form to implement” the provisions of the law.); See,
Criminal Court Non-Family Offense Order of Protection Form, available at:
The prehttp://forms.lp.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/ny/ny000013.pdf (2003).
printed form has only one line for “other conditions” as the court specifies. Also, in New
York, family offense and non-family offenses cases are treated differently in criminal
court, which will be discussed in more detail below.
156

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13(4) (McKinney 2003).

157

Upon a defendant’s conviction, if the court decides to keep the protection order in
place, it fixes the order’s time of duration. The terms of duration are identical to the
“family offense” provisions: in felony actions, five years from conviction, or three from the
date the sentence ends; in misdemeanor actions, three years from the date of conviction;
and for other offenses, one year from the conviction’s date. N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530(5)
(McKinney 2003).
158

The non family offense statute provides that “the presentation of a copy of [an]
order . . . to any police officer . . . shall constitute authority for him to arrest a person who
has violated the terms of such order.” N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13(6) (McKinney 2003).
However, the statute delineating when officers may arrest without a warrant specifically
states that only violators of orders issued in family court and those issued pursuant to the
“family offense” provisions in criminal court are eligible for warrantless arrests. N.Y.
Crim. P. 140.10(4)(b) (McKinney 2003). In any case, it is certainly clear that there are no
mandatory arrest provisions that apply to violators of standard orders.
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charges159 or that the court invoke its criminal contempt penalty powers.160
But, under any of these remedies, it is the government, not the victim, who
is in control of the proceedings.161
Finally, upon a violation, like violations of family offense criminal
orders, the court may revoke a defendant’s firearms license, order him
ineligible for such licenses, and order the defendant to surrender firearms if
there is a substantial risk that he may use or threaten to use them against the
victim.162 The court is required to take action regarding firearms where the
defendant’s willful failure to obey the order resulted in a serious physical
injury, the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon, or behavior
constituting any violent offense.163
IV. THE BENEFITS OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
In New York and in other states as well, civil orders of protection
provide unique benefits and remedies to domestic violence victims that are
in addition to, or that are in place of, the benefits the criminal system offers.
First, in other states generally, and in New York in particular, civil orders
provide procedural benefits that the criminal system does not. They may be
a preferable option for victims who may not have evidence strong enough to
sustain a criminal case. Second, civil orders provide emotional or other
intangible benefits unavailable in criminal court. They help empower a
victim by giving her a choice of remedy, and they may be preferable to
those who do not want the abuser to face criminal consequences, but simply
want the violence to end. Third, at least some evidence suggests that they
159

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.13(8) (McKinney 2003). If a defendant violates a
standard order of protection, a victim may ask the prosecutor to file misdemeanor criminal
contempt charges, or if injury or property damage was involved, she may request the
prosecutor file felony criminal contempt charges. But, unlike “family offense” orders of
protection, repeat violators of a standard criminal order of protection will not incur any
greater penalty. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51. Instead, unlike repeat violations of family
offense orders, which are at least class E felonies, each new violation of a standard criminal
order is simply a class A misdemeanor. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.50 (McKinney 2003).
160

N.Y. Jud. Law § 751 (McKinney 2003).

161

But, unlike in family offense orders where the government must make “reasonable
efforts to notify” the victim of any of their decisions regarding the case, there is no
comparable provision requiring the government to consult with or notify other victims of
similar decisions. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.12(14) (McKinney 2003).
162

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.14(3)(b) (McKinney 2003).

163

N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.14(3)(b) (McKinney 2003).
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do work to reduce or at least deter future acts of violence. Finally, civil
orders and their procedures work to prevent future violence from escalating
further. While most studies and criticisms about civil orders of protection
have measured and discussed whether orders of protection “work” by only
focusing on whether they prevent future acts of violence, civil orders of
protection work in several other ways, as well, and these benefits are often
either discounted or ignored.164 All domestic violence victims should have
equal access to the unique benefits that civil orders of protection provide.
A. Procedural and Other Benefits Generally
Civil protection orders provide unique procedural and other benefits
apart from simply forestalling future violence. First, they are easier to
obtain than a criminal conviction and criminal orders of protection. A
lower standard of proof applies, and in most states, a victim need only
sustain proof by a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. A victim may not have the evidence necessary to sustain
criminal charges, but does have evidence to support a finding that she is in
future danger under a lower burden of proof. Also, civil orders can provide
protection more quickly than those granted in the criminal system. In civil
court, a temporary order can be issued upon the victim’s sworn statement,165
or a hearing can be held in a short time. In contrast, while a temporary
order can be granted in criminal cases in relatively short order, a conviction
and “permanent” order can take months, or even years.166
Second, civil protection orders empower the victim. They can have
a positive effect on the emotional well-being of victims who obtain them by
giving them choices of remedy. This serves to give victims control over
both their cases and, more importantly, their lives.167 It also gives control
164

See Cahn & Meier, supra note 14 at 347.

165

Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, supra note 49 at 165.

166

Even in courts committed to handling domestic violence cases aggressively, the
average period of delay between filing to disposition in criminal court stretches from six to
eight months. Buzawa E. & Hotaling G., Klein A., & Byrne, J. Response to Domestic
Violence in a Pro-Active Court Setting: Final Report, Washington, D.C., National Institute
of Justice (June 1999).
167

See, Susan Keilitz, Paula L. Hannaford, & Hillery S. Efkeman, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Civil Protection Orders: The Benefits and Limitations for Victims of Domestic
Violence (1998), in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE MATTER TO A FEDERAL
OFFENSE: THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 3, 49 (Paul
Finkelsman ed., 1998). For a discussion on the importance of empowering victims of
domestic violence, see, Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411,
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back to a victim who may otherwise be in a powerless situation.168 In
criminal cases, the decision is always the government’s as to whether and
how to proceed.169 But, in a civil action, the victim can choose when and
where to file, and she can seek remedies specific to her situation. Further,
once the order is in place, where an abuser violates the order’s terms, a
victim has the choice whether or not to enforce the order by either calling
the police,170 or, in many jurisdictions, to file a contempt petition.171 In a
contempt proceeding, a victim can often request a warrant for the abuser’s
arrest.172 If the court finds that the abuser violated the order, a victim can
usually request additional relief, and she can even request that the abuser
serve time in jail for his contumacious conduct.173
In this way, the victim, rather than the state, is in control over what
happens to her. Studies show that this type of empowerment affects a
victim’s sense of well-being. In one, 72% of women who obtained
protection orders reported life improvements. After six months, that
number goes up to 85%, and more than 90% reported an increase in

1420-21 (1993).
168

One of Lenore Walker’s groundbreaking works about domestic violence discusses
that the dynamic of battering relationships includes dominance, power, and control.
Lenore Walker, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, (1984).
169

See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. P. Law. § 530.12(14) (“The people shall make reasonable
efforts to notify the complainant alleging a crime constituting a family offense when the
people have decided to decline prosecution of such crime, to dismiss the criminal charges
against the defendant or to enter into a plea agreement.”)
170

Police are more likely to respond where a victim has an order of protection; this
should serve to empower the victim even further. See, infra note 201 and accompanying
text.
171

Many states also allow pro se contempt proceedings. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50B-4 (2003) (“A party may file a motion for contempt for violation of any order . . . .
This party may file and proceed with that motion pro se, using forms provided by the clerk
of superior court or a magistrate”). For a discussion of the benefits of criminal contempt
proceedings for victims of domestic violence see David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the
Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection
Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 1153 (1995).
172

See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 48
- 27-902 (2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 518B.01(14)(b)

(2003).
173

See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 48
- 27-902 (2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 518B.01(14)(b)
(2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-21 (2003).
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emotional well-being and security.174 Other studies have resulted in similar
findings.175
Further, civil orders of protection are far more complete than the
remedies available in criminal court. Civil orders can provide relief in the
form of child custody, child visitation, and other child-care economic
orders.176 They can also require that an abuser enter drug, alcohol, angermanagement or batterer’s education counseling, and that the abuser
surrender firearms. They can order possession and use of shared residences,
automobiles, or other personal effects or that the abuser vacate a shared
residence or the residence of another party.177 They can also require that the
abuser pay the mortgage or rent on the victim’s residence, and pay for
victim’s counsel.178 They can order that the abuser pay for expenses related
to the violence such as medical expenses, counseling expenses, temporary
shelter or housing expenses, and expenses to repair or replace damaged
property.179 Also, most states have a catch-all provision that allows courts
discretion to fashion additional remedies specific to each victim.180 In
contrast, statutes governing orders of protection issued in criminal court are
usually limited in their remedies, or at least they do not delineate with the
174

Keilitz, Hannaford & Efkeman, supra note 167 at 55.

175

Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When "Enough is Enough": Battered Women's
Decision Making Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414, 417
(1995); Horton, et al., supra note 192 at 274; Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, Protection From Abuse Orders, 2 (February, 1998) (citing a 1994 National
Center for State Courts study reporting that 80% of the women who received civil orders of
protection
felt
safer.)
(available
at
http://www.pcadv.org/publications/FactSheets/PFAs.pdf).
176

See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13
- 14-102(15)(e)(I – III) (2003) (Allows court to award
temporary care and control of any minor children of either party involved for a period of
not more than one hundred twenty days); Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(5) (2003); Md. Code Ann.,
Family § 4-506(7)-(8) (2003).
177

See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102(15)(a), (d) (2003); Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(2)
(2003); Md. Code Ann., Family § 4-506(3), (12) (2003).
178

See, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(2) (2003)

179

Id.; Md. Code Ann., Family § 4-506(4) (2003)

180

See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.66.100(c)(16) (Michie 2003) providing that a protection
order may “order other relief the court determines necessary to protect the petitioner or any
household member”; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2003) (stating that a court may issue an
order of protection with “such other relief as the court deems appropriate.”)
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amount of detail the relief that the court is entitled to provide. Also, the
forms courts use to issue orders of protection are usually pre-printed, and
only have small sections available to allow a court to add provisions.181
Some states simply do not provide criminal orders of protection to those
who do not fall within the state’s definition of domestic violence victims.182
Civil protection orders can serve to align more closely the interests
of the state with those of the victim. This can serve several goals. First, it
may increase a victim’s participation in the case. In many cases, victims do
not wish their abusers to face criminal charges for a multitude of reasons.
She may need the abusers continued financial support, she may simply want
the violence to end, but not the relationship, or she may fear retaliation
stemming from criminal charges.183 She may seek the broader remedies
that civil court offers, and can choose to avoid the punitive sanctions
imposed in a criminal proceeding. In this way, a civil order of protection
can allow a victim to use, and ultimately trust the court system to protect
and follow her interests to help end the violence.
Second, when provided with an additional public remedy such as a
civil order of protection, a victim’s interests are aligned with the state’s.
States criminalized domestic violence in part to bring it into the “public”
forum and to send a message to abusers that domestic violence is
unacceptable. Also, because the state prosecutes criminal sanctions, more
force is brought to bear on the message. Civil remedies can send these
same messages. A victim’s choice to obtain an order of protection in a

181

See, e.g. Criminal Court Non-Family Offense Order of Protection Form, available
at: http://forms.lp.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/ny/ny000013.pdf (2003). The preprinted form has only one line for “other conditions” as the court specifies.
182

Illinois, for instance, does not have a specific statute allowing the court to issue
criminal orders of protection in connection with an ongoing criminal case. See, e.g., 720 Il.
Comp. Stat. § 5/12-30 (2003). A prosecutor may seek a protection order in criminal court
under the bail statute. 725 Il. Comp. Stat. § 5/110-10. However, Illinois’ definition of
family and household members for purposes of the domestic violence civil orders of
protection is one of the most expansive, and includes both cohabitants and members of
dating relationships. But, a former stepchild does not meet the definition, nor does a victim
of stranger sex assault. Illinois recently passed a separate civil statute, effective in January
of 2004, which will allow victims of sexual assault to seek a civil order of protection
regardless of their former relationship with the assailant. 740 Il. Comp. Stat. § 22/213
(2003).
183

Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L. Q. 43, 44-45 (1989) (discussing reasons why a
victim may not want her abuser to face criminal charges).
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public court, and the court’s issuance of that order, sends the message that
the violence is unacceptable. Additionally, a victim seeking sanctions
because of an order’s violation, and the police or court’s issuance of those
sanctions, can send a stronger public social message that domestic violence
is intolerable.184
Civil orders of protection may also be cheaper than criminal
remedies, both for victims and the courts.185 Unlike a criminal case where a
defendant may be arrested and jailed, civil orders allow a victim to obtain
protection while allowing the abuser to keep his job and continue providing
economic support.186 A civil protection order hearing will often be less
time consuming for the victim, and less expensive for the state than criminal
proceedings.187 A temporary civil order of protection is typically granted
after a victim files a sworn statement, and a permanent order is granted after
the court holds a short factual hearing. In contrast, criminal trials can be
lengthy, expensive, and slow.
C. Procedural Benefits Particular to New York
New York’s civil orders of protection offer many unique benefits
that its criminal system cannot. First, permanent orders of protection are
obtainable under a lower burden of proof than permanent civil orders.188 In
obtaining a disposition in family court, the victim is permitted to introduce
hearsay and other “material and relevant” evidence that would not be
permissible in criminal court.189
Second, the remedies available in a civil order are far more complete
than the remedies available in a criminal one. Criminal courts in New York
cannot issue orders relating to child custody, support, or visitation. The
184

For a discussion of the distinction between the “public” and “private” spheres, and
its affect on victims of domestic violence, see, Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991). Professor Schneider argues that masculine
concepts of privacy permit and encourage violence against women. She suggest that one
way to break down the barriers between the public and private realm is to allow victims
“public” civil remedies for their “private” abuses. Id.
185

Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 21 at 237.

186

Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, supra note 49 at 165.

187

Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 21 at 237.

188

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 832 (McKinney 2003).

189

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 834 (McKinney 2003).
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protection order statutes in criminal court, particularly as to “non family
offense” orders, limit the remedy available to stay away orders and orders
that restrain the defendant from committing acts of harassment, threats or
intimidation.190 They do not include provisions for payment of medical
fees, restitution, attorney fees, batterer education programs, or drug and
alcohol counseling.
Third, a victim has remedies at her disposal that are unavailable in
criminal court if an abuser violates a civil order of protection. In addition
to, or instead of seeking criminal charges of contempt in criminal court, she
may seek sanctions against the abuser for civil contempt in family court.
Here again, lower standards of proof apply, and the victim is not limited to
evidence that satisfies the rules of admission in criminal court. If she
wishes to send a strong message to the abuser even though the family court,
she may still seek to have him arrested and even jailed for violation of the
civil order without invoking the punitive measures of criminal court.191
Fourth, if an abuser violates a civil order more than once, he is
subject to prosecution for felony criminal contempt, a remedy unavailable
where an abuser repeatedly violates a non family offense criminal order.
Also, unlike criminal cases, in the family court, the victim, not the
government, is in charge. She determines whether, when, and how to
proceed in her claim. She also determines whether, when, and how to
proceed if the order is violated. In this way, the system returns to a victim
at least some of her lost power. Finally, civil orders of protection in New
York provide the other additional benefits such as emotional empowerment,
prevention of re-abuse, and prevention of abuse escalation.
D.

Prevention of Re-Abuse

There is evidence suggesting that the risk of a victim’s re-abuse
declines where she obtains a civil protection order. While three early
studies all reported that a protection order did not reduce the likelihood of
subsequent violence,192 more recent studies have reported that filing for a
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N.Y. Crim. P. § 530.13(a) (McKinney 2003).
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N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 846(b)(ii)(A-C) (McKinney 2003).
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Waul, supra note 6 at 54; Berk, et. al., Mutual Combat and Other Family Violence
Myths, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH
(Finkelhor, et al, eds. 1983); Janice Grau, Jeffery Fagen & Sandra Wexler, Restraining
Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and Efficacy, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLITICS AND WOMEN: THE AFTERMATH OF LEGALLY MANDATED CHANGE 13 (Claudine
Schweber & Clarice Fineman eds. 1985); Anne Horton, Kyriacos, M. Simonidis, & Lucy
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protection order resulted in a significant reduction in future abuse. In one,
the researchers studied thirty women who had obtained protection orders in
Massachusetts.193 They concluded that among victims who obtained
temporary protection orders, almost two-thirds were not re-abused within
the two-month time period following the order’s issuance.194
In another study conducted in 1999, the researchers concluded that
victims who filed for protection orders experienced a 66% decrease in
abuse.195 The same study concluded that permanent protection orders
resulted in a 68% decrease in violence, while temporary protection orders
resulted in a 52% decrease.196 Most recently, in 2003, another study
revealed that victims who obtain and maintained civil protection orders
were safer than those without them in the five-month period after they were
initially threatened.197 In the four months following that period, the effect

Simonidis, Legal Remedies for Spousal Abuse: Victim Characteristics, Expectations and
Satisfaction. 2 J. FAM. VIOL. 265-79 (1987). However, the Grau study did conclude that
victims who had fewer injuries before seeking a protection order experienced a slightly
larger decrease in re-abuse than victims with similar histories who did not obtain protection
orders. Grau, at 24 (54 % of victims without protection orders experienced re-abuse, while
44% with a protection order experienced re-abuse). But, all victims with serious abuse
histories were at about the same risk for re-abuse regardless of whether they sought a
protection order. Id. (68% without protection orders were re-abused, 67% with protection
orders were re-abused). The problem with most of these studies is their lack of control
groups. As a result, is impossible to know whether the number of victims who were revictimized is significantly different from victims who have suffered abuse, but have not
gotten an order of protection. Also, while most these studies show that approximately half
of the victims suffered additional abuse, it is impossible to know whether the half who did
not suffer re-abuse would have still escaped further abuse had she not received an order of
protection.
193

Chaudhuri & Daly, supra note 19 at 230-32.

194

Id. But, the study also concluded that all of the abusers with prior criminal records
violated the protection orders.
195

Michael Carlson, Susan D. Harris & George Holden, Protective Orders and
Domestic Violence: Risk Factors for Re-Abuse, 14 J. FAM. VIOL. 205-226 (1999) (the
study looked at 210 couples who filed protection orders between 1990 and 1992, and who
also had police records two years before and after the restraining orders).
196

197

Id.

Victoria Holt, M.A. Kernic, M.E. Wolf, F.P. Rivara, Do Protection Orders Affect
the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and Injury? 24 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED.
16-21 (2003) (the researchers conducted an interview study of 448 women over a period of
nine months).
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of the protection order had grown, and women who maintained their orders
were less likely to have been sexually abused or injured, or to have received
medical care for their abuse.198 While this research is not exhaustive, it
indicates that protection orders do have an effect on the likelihood that a
restrained party will re-abuse a petitioner.199
But, while re-abuse is largely the focus of studies on the
“effectiveness” of civil orders of protection from the perspective of whether
they prevent future violence, as established above, there are several
additional arguments for why civil protection orders work in other ways,
and why they should be available to all victims in addition to criminal
charges and criminal protection orders. Few studies address these other
benefits.
D. Prevention of Abuse Escalation
Unlike criminal charges, civil protection orders are forward-looking.
By focusing on the prevention of future acts of violence, they provide an
opportunity for the victim, the courts, and the police to prevent violence not
only from reoccurring, but also from escalating. Once an order is in place,
its violation usually constitutes its own criminal offense, or subjects the
violator to penalties for criminal contempt.
Also, it should be easier for a victim to overcome the problems of
ambivalence from prosecutors and police where a protection order is in
place.200 Most states provide for the warrantless arrest of abusers who
violate a civil order. As a result, the police are more likely to arrest,201 and
198

Id.

199

For a discussion of the problems with existing methodology of protection order
efficacy studies, see, Ko, supra note 45 at e.g., Naomi Cahn, Joan Meier, Domestic
Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. Pub. Int. L. J. 339
(1995) (“protection orders frequently do "work"; they often deter further violence and
empower the victims to make further changes for their own safety. Success stories of this
kind do not appear in the press because the absence of violence is not considered a
newsworthy event.”).
200

201

Buzawa et al., supra note 21 at 235.

Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Protection From Abuse
Orders, 2 (February, 1998) (citing a National Institute of Justice study from 1991
“reporting that police officers are more likely to arrest a perpetrator who violates a
protection order than other batterers who commit crimes against family members”)
(available at http://www.pcadv.org/publications/FactSheets/PFAs.pdf); Chaudhuri & Daly,
supra note 19 at 235-37 (women who obtained protection orders reported that before
protection orders were in place, police would not come to their aid nor respond to their
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prosecutors can prosecute the abuser despite the nature of the violation.202
At least one study has shown that arrests for protection order violations
reduce the severity of future violence.203
An abuser need not commit an act that would constitute a crime to
be in violation of a protection order. Rather, he may fail to vacate a shared
home or he may contact the victim in violation of a “no-contact” provision.
In this way, it may be easier to deter an abuser from escalating violent
conduct. Further, unlike criminal orders of protection, civil orders can
provide additional terms unavailable in criminal court, and these may also
form the bases of violation proceedings. For instance, the abuser may
refuse to pay child support or medical benefits in violation of civil order in
an attempt to intimidate the victim. Since child support or medical expense
benefits may be unavailable in a criminal order of protection, the abuser’s
conduct may result in a new, different type of violation chargeable in
criminal court as a new crime or as an act of contempt.
Proof of these types of protection order violations may be easier to
come by than proof that the abuser committed a new, separate crime.204 It
may be easier for a prosecutor to prove that an abuser contacted a victim or
failed to vacate a shared residence in violation of an order than it would be
calls for help, but once in place, police were prompt and supportive when called); Eve and
Carl Buzawa have also suggested that police may be more apt to intervene due to the
possible civil liability that may result if they do not. Buzawa et al. 21 at 236. But see,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Denying §
1983 claim for governmental failure to protect stemming from domestic violence.).
202

This is especially aided by the growth of protection order registries in many states.
As of 2001, 46 states had protection order registries. See, Lorrie Montgomery, Internet
Database for Courts Work to Keep Domestic Violence Victims Safe, (June 25, 2001)
(available at: http://www.ctc7.net/about_CTC7/media/domestic_violence.htm); See, e.g.,
Cal. Fam. Code § 6380(b) (West 2003) (establishing a Domestic Violence Restraining
Order Registry); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105(d) (creating a statewide registry of orders
of protection). These help ensure that police officers responding to a scene can determine
whether an order of protection is in effect and against whom, what the terms of the order
are, and can allow them more certainty in arresting abusers who violate the terms of an
existing order.
203

Adele Harrell, Barbara Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence
Victims, 234 in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? (Buzawa & Buzawa eds.
1996) (interview study showing that the odds of severe violence in cases in which an arrest
had been made were less than half that of cases in which no arrest had been made in the
year following the arrest; however, arrests did not reduce the likelihood of other types of
less severe abuse from recurring).
204

Id.
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to prove an underlying crime of assault or harassment. Additionally, in
several states, repeat violations of civil orders of protection result in
increased penalties and mandatory jail time.205 Also, several states increase
penalties for crimes that also violate an existing protection order.206
Obviously, to take advantage of these increased penalties for its violation, a
civil order of protection must first be in place. Where studies indicate that
serious acts of violence are preceded by a history of less serious offenses,207
the threat and use of the penalties associated with protection order
violations can serve as an additional deterrence to violence escalation, and
can allow the protective powers of the state to aid a victim before she is
subject to more serious assaults.
E. Conclusion
Civil orders of protection provide benefits to domestic violence
victims that are apart from and in addition to the remedies and protections
available in criminal court. The civil system in both New York and in other
states offer procedural advantages, such as lower burdens of proof, remedies
specific to the circumstances of domestic violence victims, and increased or
additional criminal or civil penalties for abusers who violate them. Also,
civil orders can be effective in reducing and deterring future abuse and
future escalation. Finally, civil orders provide intangible benefits that are
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See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-30 9 (2001) (makes repeated violations of civil
protection orders a class four felony); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07 (Vernon 2000) (a
conviction for protection order violation the third time is a class three felony, as is a
violation of a protection order by assault or stalking); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.50.110 (2003)
(makes violation of protection order the third time a class C felony regardless of whether
the previous convictions involved the same victim); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 586-11 (2003)
(imposing minimum forty-eight hours jail for first offense, and minimum of thirty days for
the second); Iowa Code § 236.14 (2001); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-30 (2001).
206

See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1(d) (“Unless covered under some other
provision of law providing greater punishment, a person who commits a felony at a time
when the person knows the behavior is prohibited by a valid protective order . . . shall be
guilty of a felony one class higher than the principal felony described in the charging
document.”).
207

Male domestic violence offenders who were involved in two or more domestic
violence incidents with the same victim during the study period were more than eight times
more likely than others to re-offend in the next eleven months. Buzawa, E. & Hotaling G.,
An Examination of Assaults Within the Jurisdiction of Orange District Court: Final
Report, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice (June 2001); see also, Adele
Harrell, Barbara Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims, 239 in
DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? (Buzawa & Buzawa eds. 1996) (study
showing that history of past abuse was predictive of severity of future abuse).
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difficult to measure objectively. They serve to empower a victim who may
otherwise feel powerless, they help the state send a message that domestic
violence is intolerable, and they provide a cheaper and alternative method of
protection outside of criminal court. Because of these unique benefits,
orders of protection should be available to all domestic violence victims.
The next section provides a historical explanation for New York’s
existing system in particular, and advocates its change.
V. NEW YORK’S BIFURCATED SYSTEMS: A HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
A. Introduction
New York’s system has become outdated, unresponsive, and
inadequate to protect all domestic violence victims. As discussed, New
York’s family court and criminal court systems treat victims differently
depending on whether they fall within the intersection between “family and
household” member and “family offenses.”
Protection in the form of a civil order does not exist for victims who
fall outside this intersection. The heightened protection in the form of a
“family offense” criminal order also does not exist for such victims. Her
only remedy is a standard criminal order of protection. First, New York’s
definition of “family or household” is problematic because it completely
denies civil orders of protection to victims who do not satisfy it. The
definition includes only related persons, married or formerly married
couples, and persons who share a child.208 This definition is too restrictive.
It excludes a whole host of domestic violence victims including those who
are or were living with their abuser, those who are or were in same-sex
relationships with their abuser, and those who are or were dating their
abuser. It also excludes relationships that were once formed by marriage,
but were terminated upon divorce or legal action such as former
stepchildren or former foster children.209 Such victims can only rely on the
criminal system for their protection. But, the remedies and benefits there
are not as extensive as those in civil court. Also, because the same victim
cannot satisfy the definition of “family or household member” for purposes
of family court, she is also denied heightened protection in criminal court.
Such victims cannot obtain “family offense” orders of protection; they are
limited to standard criminal protection orders, which do not provide as
much protection or as many benefits.
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N.Y. Crim. P. Law § 530.11; N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 2003).
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See, e.g., Orellana, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
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Second, New York’s definition of “family offense” is problematic
because it is highly specific, and a large number of acts that can constitute
domestic violence are excluded. While some of the excluded crimes are
less violent, most of the excluded crimes are much more violent. For
instance, all sex crimes are excluded from the list of “family offenses.” As
a result, even though she may be a member of the abuser’s “family or
household,” a victim of rape will be denied entirely the supplemental
protections that civil orders of protection provide. Her sole protection is
from criminal court. Even there, however, the identical dilemma applies.
Since rape is a crime that is not a “family offense,” the only protection to
which she is entitled is a standard criminal order of protection.
This “bifurcated” system exists as it does today because it is the
remnants of an outdated one. This system was created in the 1960s when
“family offenses” were given exclusive jurisdiction in the Family Courts. It
was a time when domestic violence was thought to be “private,” and that
family court could handle the problems of domestic violence within the
private confines of the family. The goal was to keep families together.
However, the shift has now rightly focused on ending violence. But
currently, only a portion of victims is entitled to relief. Since the focus is on
ending domestic violence, New York should amend its laws to allow
members of all intimate relationships, and all types of domestic violence
crimes, the additional benefits civil orders of protection provide.
B. Building a Bifurcated System: The exclusive jurisdiction provisions
Article Eight of the Family Court Act, which is entitled “Family
Offense Proceedings” was created in 1962.210 As explained above, the
legislature’s intent in doing this was to decriminalize domestic violence and
to put its issues in a court that, it thought, was well-suited and uniquely
qualified to solve what was at the time considered to be a private,211 family
matter.212 Section 811 of article eight stated that the section’s purpose was
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N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1975) (Repealed).
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Besharov, supra note 23 at 173.
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The drafter’s report of original chapter 686, the Family Court Act, also expressed
the legislature’s intent:
Most family offense cases currently involve assault and disorderly
conduct charges by wives against husbands. The wife's purpose in
bringing the charge is rarely to secure a criminal conviction. Each case is
somewhat different, but three patterns tend to emerge:
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help “preserve the family” and provide “practical help”:213
In the past, wives and other members of the family who suffered from
disorderly conduct or assaults by other members of the family or
Household were compelled to bring a ‘criminal charge’ to invoke the
jurisdiction of a court. Their purpose, with few exceptions, was not to
secure a criminal conviction and punishment, but practical help.
The purpose of this article is to create a civil proceeding for dealing with
such instances of disorderly conduct and assaults. It authorizes the family
court to enter orders of protection and support and contemplates
conciliation procedures. If the family court concludes that these
processes are inappropriate in a particular case, it is authorized to transfer
the proceeding to an appropriate criminal court.214

The original version of the statute gave exclusive jurisdiction to the
family court “over any proceeding concerning acts which would constitute
Some wives despair of salvaging their marriage. They seek to use the
threat of criminal prosecution to compel the husband to leave home.
Their main purpose is to secure protection, support, and custody of
children--matters that are beyond the formal powers of criminal courts.
Others (normally married less than five years) treat the assault or
disorderly conduct as a sign of trouble in their marriage. They turn to the
court to obtain assistance in resolving the underlying difficulty. Hence,
their main purpose is a form of conciliation. The criminal charge in these
cases is thus essentially a means for invoking the court's jurisdiction,
though it is said that the possibility of criminal prosecution deters
husbands from continuing to beat their wives while the conciliation
procedures are used.
In the third group are those who have been married for more than five
years and who are prepared to settle for considerably less than an ideal
existence. The husband works and supports the family. But, he drinks on
weekends and beats or verbally abuses the wife. The wife's purpose here
is to use the court proceeding to persuade her husband to stop beating her
and, perhaps, to stop heavy drinking. Home Term in New York City,
which has jurisdiction over such matters, uses Psychiatric and
Alcoholism Clinics in an effort to help.
Without expecting miracles, the Committee believes that the civil
proceeding provided in the new Family Court Act is better adapted for
dealing with the underlying family difficulties than the penal method it
would replace.
Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, supra note 24.
213

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 811 (McKinney 1981) (repealed)
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disorderly conduct or assault between spouses or between parent and child
or between members of the same family or household.”215 Two years later,
in 1964, in addition to disorderly conduct or assault, the legislature added
harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, and attempted assault to the
crimes over which the family court had exclusive jurisdiction.216
In passing the Family Court Act, the legislature intended that these
delineated acts would no longer be crimes if they were committed against a
family or household member. Instead, they were entitled “family offenses.”
The criminal court could only hear “family offenses” if the family court
transferred the case.217 This procedure was successful in decriminalizing
family offenses. The family court’s discretionary transfer power was used
in only two percent of the 18,511 petitions that were filed in 1971-72, and
the 17,277 petitions filed in 1972-73.218 It was this act that created the only
avenue in the civil law (apart from divorce proceedings) where a victim of
domestic violence could obtain a “family offense” civil order of protection.
In the original version of the statute, “members of the same family
or household,” was not defined.219 As a result, the courts were free to
interpret the term, and often included non-married couples in the definition.
The problem, of course, was that it was the abusers who advocated this
more expansive definition of family or household to avoid the sanctions of
criminal court.
For instance, in People v. Dugar220, a man who had been living with
a woman and her several children for four years argued that the criminal
court did not have jurisdiction over his misdemeanor assault charge. He
argued that because he supported the woman and her children economically,
and had eaten, slept, and generally subsided with them as a single domestic
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N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 1962) (repealed).
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N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 1964)(repealed).
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Marjory Fields, Trial of Family Offenses: A Practice Guide for Lawyers, 82 P.L.I.
N.Y. 353, (2000).
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Annual Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York, 1972-73, p.
350; Fields, supra, note 217 at 359. See also, Wessel, Jurisdiction Over Family Offenses
In New York: A Reconsideration of the Provisions For Choice of Forum, 31 SYR. L. REV.
601, 610 (1981).
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N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812 (McKinney 1975) (Repealed).
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235 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1962).
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unit, they were of the same “household.”221 Because they were of the same
household, he argued, jurisdiction vested exclusively in family court and
could only be transferred to the criminal court from family court.222 The
court agreed and dismissed the case. In so holding, the court first admitted
that “it would seem strange at first blush that a court whose purpose, in
large part, is restoration and preservation of marriages, should concern itself
with crimes between persons who are living in a meretricious
relationship.”223 But, the court went on to observe the following:
The legislature must be presumed to have been aware of a fact that is common
knowledge to every law enforcement and social agency and to every court in this
state, namely: there are countless households where man and woman reside with
their offspring in a domestic relationship on a permanent basis without being
legally married. Such households are responsible for many of the most difficult
social problems concerning such agencies on a daily, routine basis. They present
behaviour problems, support problems, mental and emotional problems. They
concern the health, welfare and safety of children. They result in filiation
proceedings, support proceedings and juvenile proceedings. In short, from a
social point of view, this is a situation where the unique and flexible procedures
and services available in the Family Court may possibly find a remedy. In some
instances it may even be possible to arrange a legitimate marriage or at least
furnish adequate counseling and protection.224

It seems the court in Dugar was well-meaning by recognizing that,
in reality, this collection of people operated like a marital family, and that
family court was well-suited to its problems. But, at the time, this was a
double-edged sword. Dugar was the first case to decide the issue of
whether cohabitants were covered by the family court statute. The court
seemed willing to consider cohabitant relationships as functionally and
actually the same as marital ones, and seemed comfortable with the decriminalization purposes of family court. However, more and more abusers
who were committing more violent acts against their cohabitants were
asking the criminal court to dismiss their cases on jurisdictional grounds. 225

221

Id. at 154.

222

Id. at 154.

223

Id. at 153.

224

Id. at 653-54. Of course, this type of reasoning did not take into account what
would later become the ultimate goal of orders of protection: to end the violence inflicted
by one party against another.
225

See, e.g, People v. Johnson, 265 N.Y.S.2d 260 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1965) (indictment of
second degree assault transferred to family court where victim and defendant had held
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Other courts rejected Dugar’s reasoning. They discussed the Family
Court Act’s interests in preserving the family unit, its public policy
concerns of giving “practical help,” and the protection it would be
providing to undeserving members of “immoral” unions.226 These courts
largely disregarded the dual roles that family court was playing even then.
While there were “conciliatory” procedures in place, one of the provisions
of the Family Court Act was the civil order of protection provision. One
court recognized the importance of this provision, especially in non-marital
abusive relationships:
[T]he Family court is authorized, among other things . . . to issue a
temporary order of protection, which may . . . set forth reasonable
conditions of behavior . . . . Thus, the order of protection, as
distinguished from a reconciliation, may require the respondent
(defendant) to refrain from visiting the home or it may direct him to
abstain from offensive conduct against any member of the household unit
and may direct him to refrain from acts of commission or omission that
may tend to make the home an improper place for a child. That such an
order may be even more necessary against one who is not a spouse, or a
member of the family, but merely a member of the ‘household’ is too
self-evident to require elucidation.227

Here, the court recognized the important role that civil orders of protection
play in ending violence especially in cohabitation relationships. From its
statement that the need for protection in non-marital relationships is “too
self-evident to require elucidation,” the court infers that members of nonmarital relationships are more willing to assault their partners. While

themselves out as husband and wife).
226

See, e.g., People v. Ostrander, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1968). There, the
court refused to dismiss indictment for first degree assault where defendant, a woman who
was married to someone else, stabbed her live-in boyfriend in the chest. The court held
that because the defendant committed the crime of adultery, to transfer the case to family
court would be protecting an “immoral relationship” that was in violation of the Penal Law.
Id. at 387. In rejecting Dugar’s reasoning, the court explained that “if a literal
interpretation of the word ‘household’ were adopted, . . . Article 8 if the Family Court Act
would be available to homosexuals living together as husband and wife, and polygamists.”
Id. at 297, ftnt. 1. Also, in Best v. Macklin, 260 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1965) the
family court refused jurisdiction and transferred the case to criminal court where the
victim, together with her two children, lived with the assailant. The court held that “it is
the public policy of the State not to place children in a situation which would impair their
morals.” Id. at 221.
227

People v. James, 287 N.Y.S.2d 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (dismissing assault in the
first degree and possession of dangerous weapons charges for transfer to the family court
where victim and defendant lived together and held themselves out as husband and wife).
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difficult to gauge, some studies suggests this is, in fact, still the case.228
Ultimately, the question whether family court had jurisdiction over
cohabitants was resolved by New York’s Court of Appeals in People v.
Allen.229 There, the court held that only members of a solemnized marriage
or a “recognized”230 common-law union were “family or household”
members for purposes of civil protection order jurisdiction. Specifically,
the court held that the purposes contemplated by the Family Court Act,
namely family cohesion, were inapplicable to non-marital relationships,231
and the state had no interest in maintaining such relationships.232
More interesting, even, than the specific grounds on which the court
ruled were the specific cases that it refused to dismiss. Like Dugar, the
Allen court was dealing with several defendants who were attempting to
have their criminal cases dismissed. But, unlike Dugar, which dealt with a
misdemeanor assault, the Allen court was careful to outline the facts of the
higher-level offenses with which it was dealing. All three defendants had
already been convicted and sentenced to time for their felonies. One was
convicted of sodomy, while the other two were convicted of second degree
assault and possession of dangerous weapons charges. One of the
defendants “broke into an apartment and stabbed his former girlfriend with
an ice pick.”233 He had been sentenced to four years prison. It is not a
stretch to think that perhaps the court was also concerned that the
defendants who were convicted and sentenced for these crimes would
escape any criminal scrutiny.
Later courts also excluded other more violent crimes from the
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See, Klein and Orloff, supra note 15 at 837 citing studies suggesting that the
amount of violence in non-marital relationships is at least equal to, or may surpass, the rate
of violence between married couples.
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27 N.Y.2d 108, 113 (N.Y. 1970).
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The court specifically refused to “recognize” the relationship. “Certainly, making
available conciliation procedures, as contemplated by the Family Court Act, to such
informal and illicit relationships as those before us, would clearly be contrary to public
policy by conferring the privileges of Family Court services to a relationship which the
Legislature has chosen not to recognize.” Id. at 112-13.
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exclusive jurisdiction of the family court by limiting the list of “family
offenses” through creative statutory interpretation.
In Whiting v.
Shepard,234 a defendant who was accused of murdering his four-month-old
daughter argued that his case should be transferred to the family court under
the exclusive jurisdictional provisions. The court denied the request
holding that even though a basic element of the crimes of murder and
manslaughter is assault did not bring those more violent offenses within the
list of family offenses even though they may be committed by one family
member against another.235 In so holding, the court heavily relied on the
conciliatory intent of the statute and explained that because “the victims of
the crimes of manslaughter and murder are obviously in no position to
invoke the jurisdiction of the Family Court for practical help in the nature of
protection or counciliation [sic] . . . . the Legislature certainly did not
intend that these crimes should come within the jurisdiction of the Family
Court.”236
Instead, the court explained, “the Legislature has thus
differentiated between serious and minor offenses on reasonable and logical
grounds, and we can only conclude that the Family Court has no jurisdiction
over offenses of manslaughter or murder since, by the very nature of these
offenses, no future benefit or protection may be afforded to the victim.”237
However, the court used this reasoning to exclude additional serious
crimes from family court’s jurisdiction even though the victim was left alive
and could therefore arguably benefit from the “practical help” the family
court could provide. In People v. Bronson238 a husband threatened to kill
his wife,239 stated he was going to kill her that night; he then attempted to
run over her with his truck. The grand jury indicted the defendant with
attempted murder, and, during trial, the prosecutor asked for the lesser
included offense of first degree assault. The defendant was convicted of the
assault charge. The defendant sought the dismissal of the case on
jurisdictional grounds. In deciding the case, the court relied on Whiting to
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312 N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
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hold that like murder, even though assault was a basic element of attempted
murder, it did not bring it within the list of family offenses “even though
such offenses may be committed between spouses.”240 The court held that
because the defendant was originally charged with attempted murder, the
fact that the court later added first degree assault was inapposite.241
Nevertheless, the court ignored the policy grounds on which the Whiting
court based its decision, and instead stretched the interpretation of the
statute to keep a more violent crime in criminal court.
The court similarly used a creative reading of the statute to keep
jurisdiction over sex assaults even though they involved family or
household members. Again, it seemed concerned with keeping more
violent crimes in criminal court. In People ex rel. Doty v. Krueger,242 the
defendant was indicted for first degree sodomy, and first degree sexual
assault for engaging in forcible sexual contact with his nine-year old cousin.
He argued that because he was related to his cousin, and because they lived
in the same household, the exclusive family court jurisdiction provisions
applied. The court disagreed holding that the intent of the statute was to
allow the family court to handle “domestic quarrels”243 and that the
interpretation of “the serious and heinous acts and conduct implicit in the
charges of sodomy and sexual abuse and contact with a nine-year old child
as 'domestic quarrels' . . . . is repugnant and plainly untenable.244
But, the truth was that the legislature had not intended to limit the
family court’s jurisdiction to less violent “domestic quarrels.” As explained
by the court in People v. Johnson, the court upon which Krueger relied, the
legislature had considered and rejected language that would have given
family court jurisdiction over only non-felonious assaults:
It is evident that careful thought was given by the Legislature to the
question of the Family Court's jurisdiction over family assaults before the
decision was made to include all such assaults and not simply those
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In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Matter of Whiting v. Shepard, 312
N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). There, the court held that because victims of murder
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which were trivial. Although the Judicial Conference had recommended,
several years before the creation of the Family Court, that the proposed
“Family Court should have jurisdiction over . . . Crimes and offenses,
Except felonies, by or against children or between spouses”, neither the
Judiciary Article of the Constitution nor the Family Court Act so limited
the court's jurisdiction; the exclusionary words, “except felonies”, were
significantly omitted. And, as a matter of fact, the Judicial Conference
unequivocally declared in 1963 that “The jurisdiction of the Family
Court is not limited to any particular degree of assault.”245

However, the realities of a system’s failings that separated some
“serious” from “non-serious” crimes became more apparent as time went
on. Despite the promises of the conciliatory procedures and the “practical
help” that the Family Court Act was meant to give to domestic violence
victims, the procedures put in place simply were not protecting women
from further violence and even death.246 As reform efforts began to ascend
in the late 1970s, a new consensus developed that the process of
decriminalizing had gone too far. The emphasis on family cohesion rather
than ending violence against women all “had the net effect of giving abused
spouses a practical license to continue assaults.”247
Change was slow and piecemeal, which has resulted in today’s
system. Responding to pressures from women’s groups and victim
advocates, the legislature held hearings in 1977 to determine whether the
exclusive jurisdictional system was serving the stated goal of family
cohesion, or whether it was legitimizing domestic violence.248 That year in
what ultimately proved an awkward change, the statute was amended to
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282 N.Y.S.2d 481, 484-85 (N.Y. 1967). In Johnson, a husband assaulted his wife
with a knife and was indicted for second degree assault. He sought to transfer the case to
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allow concurrent jurisdiction in the family and criminal courts, but only
until victims chose whether to file in criminal or family court. Once they
chose their forum, they could not file in the other.249 Also, still one of the
stated purposes of the difference in treatment was that “an adjudication in
family court is for the purpose of attempting to keep the family unit
intact.”250
Also in 1977, the Family Court Act’s provisions relating to the
definition of “family or household member,” also underwent change. To
legislate what the court in Allen had held, the legislature amended the
statutory definition of “family and household member” to include only
“persons legally married to one another” and “persons related by
consanguinity or affinity.”251 However, women’s advocates complained
that this definition was too narrow.252 The main complaints were that the
definition excluded formerly married spouses and informal or meretricious
relationships, and even excluded such relationships that had produced
children.253
To further facilitate the process of allowing victims to proceed in
criminal court, the legislature passed a statute to deal with victims of
“family offenses” in criminal court. In 1977 it passed section 530.11254,
entitled “Protection for victims of family offenses,” which incorporated the
same definitions of “family or household member.” It provided a system by
which the criminal court could issue protection orders. A corollary statute,
entitled “protection of victims of crimes, other than family offenses” was
passed in 1981. It provided for the criminal court to issue less
comprehensive “non family offense” criminal orders of protection to
victims who were not crimes of the a delineated family offense, or who
249

The specific language of the statute read “a choice of forum by a complainant or
petitioner bars any subsequent proceeding in an alternative court for the same offense.”
N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 812(b) (McKinney 1977) (repealed). New York was the only state
that required a victim to elect one jurisdiction at the exclusion of the other. Other states
allowed victims the option of civil, criminal, or both remedies. Besharov, supra note 23 at
181.
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were not a “family or household member” of the abuser. These two
different statutes to handle different varieties of crimes and victims are still
in effect today.
In 1980, in response to the push to criminalize domestic violence,
the legislature further amended the list of family offenses. The list was
amended to exclude assault in the first degree, which was assault using a
deadly weapon.255 The legislature explained that it was amending the law
to send a message that “serious” acts of violence in the home would not be
tolerated:
This exclusion, like the present exclusion of attempted murder, is a public policy
statement that serious acts of violence between family members will not be
tolerated. Violence in the home is as serious a breach of public order and safety
as violence in the streets. . . . Strengthening of legal sanctions against violence
in the home is a step toward stopping it in individual cases, and toward educating
the public that violence in the homes is as much a criminal act as violence in a
public place.256

This was the first public statement from the legislature since 1962 that
domestic violence was intolerable. Of course, this sent more than one
message. Aside from sending the message that “serious” acts of violence
would not be tolerated in the home, it also said less “serious” acts would be.
It also sent the message that the same acts committed against members of
the same family or household were still not crimes, merely “family
offenses.” But, if the same act were committed against a non-family
member, the abuser was chargeable in criminal court.
Also, in 1981, § 811 of the Family Court Act, which stated the Act’s
intent about “practical help” and the importance of family cohesion was
repealed.257 Presumably, this was meant to reflect a shift toward a focus on
ending violence. Section 812(d) was amended to state that family court
proceedings were no longer to keep the “family unit intact,” but were to
“stop the violence, end the family disruption, and obtain protection.”258 The
legislature stated “that its first priority is protecting family members by
ending the violence.
After that is accomplished, counseling and
reconciliation can be undertaken in an atmosphere of security for all
255
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members of the family.”259 But, the problem was still the jurisdictional
provisions. Once a victim chose family court, the criminal courts lost
jurisdiction.260 The legislature was dealing with the tension between
treating “serious” domestic violence like crime and “less serious crime” like
a “family offense.”
As a result, the legislature began adding and omitting more offenses to
the list of family offenses. It was careful to keep more violent crimes
excluded. The family offense provisions underwent several changes and
other more specific crimes were added. The legislature was careful to use
the same language as the Penal Law so that the delineated offenses were
tied to those definitions. As of 1994, the statute listed the following crimes:
disorderly conduct, harassment in the first and second degree, aggravated
harassment in the second (but not the first) degree, menacing in the second
and third degree (but not the first), assault in the second and third degree
(but not the first), or attempted assault between spouses.
In 1994, the Family Court Act statute was amended once again with
an attempt to swing the pendulum back toward the criminalization of
domestic violence. Under the amendment, the victim was still required to
choose a forum, but the election did not become irrevocable until 72 hours
after she filed a petition.261
In making this change, the legislature restated its commitment to
ending violence, and minimized any focus on family cohesion. Instead, the
goal was to put an end to the violence. In support of this position, the
legislature cited the fact that domestic violence “is a crime which destroys
the household as a place of safety, sanctuary, freedom and nurturing for all
household members.”262 It also noted that domestic violence “results in
tremendous costs to our social services, legal, medical and criminal justice
systems, as they are all confronted with its tragic aftermath,” and that is “the
single major cause of injury to women. More women are hurt from being
beaten than are injured in auto accidents, muggings and rapes combined.”263
Despite the evolution of the law in New York, the legislature explained,
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“death and serious physical injury by and between family members
continues unabated. The victims of family offenses must be entitled to the
fullest protections of our civil and criminal laws.” The intent was not to
normalize domestic violence, but to condemn its more serious forms in
public:264
Therefore, the legislature finds and determines that it is necessary to
strengthen materially New York’s statutes by providing for immediate
deterrent actions by law enforcement officials and members of the
judiciary, by increasing penalties for acts of violence within the
household, and by integrating the purposes of the family and criminal
laws to assure clear and certain standards of protection for New York’s
families consistent with the interests of fairness and substantial justice.265

Nevertheless, the exclusive jurisdictional provisions functionally remained
in effect because the choice of forum was still irrevocable after 72 hours.
As a result, some acts were crimes, while others were still mere “family
offenses.”
Also in 1994, the legislature amended the criminal contempt statutes
in an attempt to strengthen the domestic violence statutes. At that time,
several of the criminal statutes used to deal with domestic violence were
only punishable as misdemeanors, including violations of civil and criminal
family offense orders of protection. As a result, the legislature amended the
crime of criminal contempt in the second degree, which was normally a
class A misdemeanor, such that if a defendant violated a “family offense”
order of protection issued either in family or criminal court and was
convicted on criminal contempt in the second degree within the preceding
five years, he was guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree, a class “E”
felony.266

264

Specifically, the legislature stated the following:
A great deal of progress has been achieved in the effort to heighten
public awareness about domestic violence and to provide services for
affective family members . . . These efforts have also played a key role in
bringing this issue into the open . . . . In recent years, for example, what
was once largely considered a private matter has come to be more
correctly regarded as criminal behavior.
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The choice of forum was not eliminated until 1996,267 and the
criminal court was given concurrent jurisdiction over all “family offenses.”
In 1999, the year the stalking offenses were created, the legislature added to
the list of “family offenses” first, second, third and fourth degree
stalking.268 Because there was no longer a danger that the criminal court
would be divested of jurisdiction from crimes added to the list of family
offenses, the legislature was free to add all four degrees of the new offense.
This stands in stark contrast to the other offenses that are still omitted from
the list of “family offenses,” such as first degree assault.
As for the definition of “family or household” member, in response
to part of the concerns of women’s groups about unmarried and formerly
married people with children, the definition of “family or household” was
expanded in 1984 to include formerly married persons, and persons who
shared a common child.269 In 1987, New York’s legislature determined that
there was a need to develop and fund programs to assist domestic violence
victims. As a result, it passed article 6-A of the New York State Social
apply to a defendant who violates a non family offense criminal order of protection.
However, there are provisions that enhance criminal contempt crimes upon violation of any
order of protection regardless of whether the order is a “family offense” order of
protection. The crime of criminal contempt in the second degree can also constitute a class
E felony if, in violation of any order of protection, a defendant intentionally places the
victim in reasonable fear of injury by displaying a weapon, by engaging in a repeated
course of conduct, by communicating with the victim, by coming in physical contact with
the victim with intent to harass, annoy threaten or alarm, or by physical menace. See also,
Legislative Memorandum for Senate Bill 7930, “The remedy proposed [by this amendment]
is simple and straightforward: whenever defendants violate orders of protection by
committing acts constituting independent crimes, such as menacing in the second degree,
menacing in the third degree or aggravated harassment in the second degree, they can be
prosecuted for committing the class E felony of criminal contempt in the second degree.
Thus, a felony offense will be committed when a defendant violates an order of protection
and in doing so brandishes a weapon at, threatens, stalks, menaces or harasses a person for
whose protection the order was issued.” Id. Also, an abuser is guilty of first degree
criminal contempt if in violation of any order he damages the victim’s property in an
amount in excess of two hundred fifty dollars. N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51 (McKinney
2003). Finally, an abuser may commit aggravated criminal contempt, a class D felony, if
in violation of any order of protection, he intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury.
N.Y. Penal Law § 215.52 (McKinney 2003).
267
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Services Law, the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.270 It sets forth
requirements and definitions for residential and non-residential services for
domestic violence victims. This Act also defines a victim of domestic
violence as follows:
[A]ny person 16 years of age or older, any married person or parent
accompanied by his or her minor child or children in situations in which
such person or person's child is a victim of an act which would constitute a
violation of the Penal Law, including, but not limited to acts constituting
disorderly conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment,
kidnapping, assault, attempted assault, or attempted murder” which result
in injury or risk of harm . . . and such acts or acts are or alleged to have
been committed by a “family or household member.”271

Not only does this definition include additional crimes such as
kidnapping, attempted murder, and all forms of menacing and
harassment,272 but its definition of family or household member is much
more expansive. It not only includes the same individuals as those under
sections 812 of the Family Court Act, but it also includes “unrelated persons
who are continually or at regular intervals living in the same household or
who have in the past continually or at regular intervals lived in the same
household273 or “any other category of individuals deemed to be a victim of
domestic violence as defined by the department in regulation.”274 One of
the department of social services regulations that governs residential
domestic violence programs defines “family or household member” as
including “unrelated persons who have had intimate or continuous social
contact with one another and who have access to one another’s
household.”275 Consequently, this definition both includes more crimes that
render a domestic violence victim eligible for services, and includes
virtually all forms of intimate relationships.276
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N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a – 459-g (McKinney 2003)

271

N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a(1) (McKinney 2003)

272

Notably, the statute excludes sex crimes and stalking crimes, but presumably the
explicit statement that the list is non-exhaustive would seem to encompass all crimes of
domestic violence.
273

N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a(1)(ii)(e) (McKinney 2003).

274

N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a(1)(ii)(f) (McKinney 2003).

275

N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regis. tit. 18, § 452.2(g)(2)(vi) (2003).

276

Some relationships may still be excluded, however, such as persons formerly

62

Judith A. Smith

15-Apr-04

Nevertheless, the legislature has refused to adopt these same
definitions for the purposes of civil and criminal domestic violence
protection orders. Currently, for purposes of the Family Court Act, and for
“family offenses” in criminal court, “members of the same family or
household means the following: (a) persons related by consanguinity277 or
affinity;278 (b) persons legally married to one another; (c) persons formerly
married to one another; and (d) persons who have a child in common
regardless whether such persons have lived together at any time.”279
Almost yearly, there have been unsuccessful attempts to extend the
definition to at least include unmarried cohabitants.280 The courts continue
to interpret the jurisdictional requirement strictly.281 The legacy of the
exclusive jurisdiction provisions remains to the detriment of domestic
violence victims.
New York’s legislature created the family court “family offense”
civil protection order provisions to decriminalize domestic violence. The
aim was to provide “practical help” to families and to forward the goal of
family cohesion. Because of this historic context, and because of the
change in social perceptions regarding domestic violence that took place
over time, the legislature and the courts worked together to create a
bifurcated system that pervaded in both the civil and criminal systems. It
treated victims differently depending on whether they were a member of the
related by marriage if they did not share a household, or members of a dating relationship
who do not have access to one another’s household.
277

“Consanguinity” is the “relationship by blood.” Bryan A. Garner, A DICTIONARY
(2nd ed.)
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ed. 1990).
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same “family or household” as their abusers and whether they were victims
of specific “family offenses.”
VI. A CALL FOR REFORM
Today, the focus of civil orders of protection in family court is not
family cohesion or “practical help.” Instead, the purpose of such orders in
both family and criminal court is to stop the violence and to prevent
violence from escalating. Given that new focus and the social shift in the
perceptions about domestic violence generally and civil orders of protection
more particularly, the bifurcated system no longer works. Not only are
some victims of domestic violence completely unable to obtain civil orders
of protection, others are only provided protection for less serious “family
offenses.” It is time for New York’s legislature to change its system to
reflect this social shift and to provide equal protection to all victims of
domestic violence.
New York’s differential treatment of family offenses from non
family offenses creates two problems: not all victims of domestic violence
are protected, and those who are, are not protected adequately. Victims of
abusers’ “families or households” are not adequately protected because of
the legacy of the bifurcated system that has developed since the 1960s.
Many crimes that should be included in the list of “family offenses” are
omitted. This means that even if victims are part of the abusers family or
household, they cannot obtain a civil order of protection from an abuser,
and must instead rely solely on the criminal system. “Non family offense”
criminal orders of protection, while providing some protection, are
insufficient in relation to the additional benefits that civil orders provide.
Also, New York’s definition of “family or household member” in
the family and criminal courts is too narrow. It not only excludes members
of dating relationships, but, unlike any other state in the country, it
completely excludes members of cohabitation relationships. Many of the
concerns relating to married couples also relate to members of other
intimate relationships. Civil orders of protection, unlike criminal ones, are
to prevent and deter future acts of violence. There is little reason to deny
them to all members of intimate relationships and to provide their benefits
to these victims in addition to the remedies available in criminal court. The
law should be reformed to provide adequate protection to all victims.
A. Definition of “family offense”: continuing problems
Assuming the family court has jurisdiction over the “family offense”
proceeding, the complaints about the civil system are few. It provides an
extra remedy for the victim in addition to the options available to her in
criminal court. In family court, she can seek the specific types of relief,
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including orders relating to children, that apply to her situation. If an abuser
violates the terms of the order, she has a multitude of options. She can seek
the help of police, she can request that criminal charges or criminal
contempt charges be filed, she can initiate a new proceeding in family court,
or, she has the further option of pursuing civil contempt proceedings. Also,
if the abuser violates the order, he is subject to additional criminal and civil
penalties not only due to the violative act, but also due to the fact that he
violated an existing order. In this way, the victim is empowered to make
her own decisions and to seek her own remedies, and the state’s interests in
prevention of future risk of abuse and escalation of abuse are met.
But, the primary problem with the Family Court Act here is that it
does not provide protection to family victims unless the abuser commits a
“family offense.” The court is divested of jurisdiction over a huge number
of crimes, both more violent and less so, that certainly could be
characterized as crimes of domestic violence.282 The list of crimes that
could include domestic violence, but that are currently excluded from the
list of family offenses include the following: all sex crimes;283 first degree
assault;284 first degree harassment; first degree menacing; aggravated
harassment; reckless endangerment;285 kidnapping; coercion286; unlawful
imprisonment; attempted murder; criminal mischief; arson; criminal
trespass; burglary; robbery; eavesdropping;287 unlawful surveillance;288 and
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Professor Merica has defined domestic violence as “a pattern of interaction that
includes the use of physical violence, coercion, intimidation, isolation, and/or emotional,
economic, or sexual abuse by one intimate partner to maintain power and control over the
other intimate partner." Jo Ann Merica, The Lawyer's Basic Guide to Domestic Violence,
62 TEX. B.J. 915, 915 (1999).
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weapons crimes.289 Even if a victim is or was married to, is related to, or
shares a child with the perpetrator, she cannot obtain any form of civil
protection. Instead, she must avail herself of the remedies available only in
criminal court and hope that the prosecutor will proceed with her case and
that it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This may also serve to
reward abusers who commit more serious crimes because they avoid the
lesser burdens of proof and additional sanctions applicable in family court.
The difference between family and non family offenses also presents
special problems if the victim and the abuser share children. Often victims
of domestic violence are economically dependent on their abusers. She
may rely on him for medical expenses and child support. In family court,
the order of protection can include remedies relating to child support and
visitation as well as medical expenses,290 but this is not true in criminal
court. The non family offense criminal orders do not specifically provide
for orders relating to children, and the criminal court lacks jurisdiction over
some provisions such as child custody and support. While a victim may
seek other remedies in family court, they will not usually specifically
address future violent conduct, nor is the criminal system adequately
equipped to address the violation of such orders.
Finally, if denied a remedy in civil court, the victim is denied all the
benefits that civil orders of protection provide over, and in addition to, those
available in criminal court.291 She may wish to avoid subjecting the abuser
to criminal sanctions in criminal court because she needs his continued
financial support, or she may fear increased retaliation if she pursues
criminal charges. She may wish to use the civil contempt proceedings
available in civil court, which are not available in criminal court. Or, she
may simply want to be in control of the case rather than trusting her
decisions to a prosecutor.
The legislature needs to revisit and reform its list of “family
offenses.” There is no reason to keep the “family offense” provisions
limited to a specific list of crimes. This is unduly restrictive; it undermines
the seriousness of the acts that are included, and excludes entirely the acts
that are not. It also requires that the victim allege facts sufficient to satisfy
the elements of each crime. Instead, the statute should be amended to
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include a more generic definition of acts of domestic violence. For
instance, the legislature may consider adopting a statute that provides for
civil orders of protection “to prevent domestic violence.” In turn, “domestic
violence” could be defined as the following:
an act or pattern of acts that include acts or threatened acts of violence, or
any act or pattern of acts constituting a crime in violation of chapter 40 of
the consolidated laws of New York, or any municipal ordinance
violation, when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment,
intimidation, or revenge directed against a person with whom the actor is
or has been in an intimate relationship.292

A statute such as this eliminates a victim’s need to establish that the abuser
committed acts satisfying every element of a specific crime. Instead, a
statute such as this incorporates all acts constituting domestic violence.
In the 1960s, the focus was on familial cohesion. That is no longer
the case. While legislature’s desire then may have been to deal with less
serious forms of violence in family court, the focus there is now on ending
violence, and preventing future violence from recurring or escalating.
Criminal orders of protection alone are insufficient to serve this goal.
Victims should be able to avail themselves of the additional protection
provided in civil court. The historical basis for this system is plain. It was
set up during a different time. But, the evolution toward change has been
needlessly slow. Now, because the state is not divested of seeking criminal
charges even if the offender is a member of the victim’s family or
household, a victim should be allowed to seek every form of protection that
she can regardless, and in some cases because of, the nature of the crime.
B. Definition of “family or household member”: continued rationales and
problems
Acts of domestic violence do not occur only between married and
formerly married people and between parents of a common child. Instead,
domestic violence occurs in all forms of intimate relationships. While New
York need not necessarily amend its statute to redefine “family or
household” to protect the members of these relationships in the same way, it
should extend the same protection to all members of intimate relationships
that are currently available to members of the same “family or household.”
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This proposed statute is loosely based on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102 (2003).
Colorado’s system allows “any municipal court of record . . . any county court, and any
district court” to have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent
civil restraining order against an adult or a juvenile who is ten years of age or older for the
purposes of preventing assaults and threatened bodily harm, domestic abuse, emotional
abuse of the elderly, and stalking. The courts have
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While in some circumstances the legislature may be able to provide rational
reasons why it may not wish to redefine “family or household member” to
include other types of relationships, it cannot provide rational reasons to
deny protection to all victims of domestic violence in light of the stated
governmental interests in providing civil orders of protection.293
As a result, the legislature should revisit the scheme that is currently
in place and should redefine the types of relationships entitled to civil
protection order coverage. New York has two options. First, it could
amend the existing definition of “family or household” to include
cohabitants and members of dating relationships. Second, it could amend
the statutory scheme to allow all victims of domestic violence to obtain
orders of protection even if the remedy is not in family court, and create a
new definition of “intimate relationship.” Outside the context of provisions
for children, there is little reason to keep civil orders of protection in family
court. Instead, the legislature could provide original, concurrent jurisdiction
to any court of record as well as, or instead of, family court. Then, the
legislature could expand the types of relationships entitled to protection
without changing its definition of “family or household.” For instance, in
connection with the statute proposed above, it could adopt the following
definition of “intimate relationship:”
A relationship between persons related either by blood, marriage, or
former marriage, between past or present spouses, past or present
cohabitants, persons who are the parents of the same child, or between
two persons, including two persons not of the opposite sex, who have or
had a social relationship of a romantic, but not necessarily sexual
nature.294
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While this article briefly touches on the concepts of equal protection here, an indepth discussion of it is beyond its scope. For a more in-depth discussion of the
intersection of the Equal Protection Clause and civil orders of protection, particularly as it
relates to same-sex relationships, see Nancy E. Murphy, Note, Queer Justice: Equal
Protection for Victims of Same- Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335 (1995);
Pamela M. Jablow, Note, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting Battered
Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1117
(2000).
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This proposed language borrows from Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-800.3(2) (2003) and
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-3(a), (d) (2003). Colorado’s statute reads as follows: “’Intimate
relationship’ means a relationship between spouses, former spouses, past or present
unmarried couples, or persons who are both the parents of the same child regardless of
whether the persons have been married or have lived together at any time.” Mississippi’s
statue defines abuse and dating relationship as follows: “’Abuse’ means the occurrence of
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together or who formerly resided together or between individuals who have a current
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A statute like this would serve several goals. First, it would bring
New York into compliance with the forty-nine other states that currently
allow protection to cohabitants. Second, it would bring New York into
compliance with the majority of states that provide protection to members
of dating relationships.295 Finally, it would simply provide protection
where it is needed.
However, New York’s legislature has refused to pass statutes
expanding the definition of “family or household” to include cohabitants
and dating relationships, or to provide civil orders of protection to all
victims of domestic violence in a forum outside family court. The
government may state several reasons; however, the reasons are neither
rational nor related to the interests that the legislature has stated for
providing civil orders of protection.
One reason the legislature has failed to change the law may be that it
believes domestic violence is not a problem outside the relationships
currently covered. Empirically, this is not the case. A large amount of
evidence suggests that domestic violence pervades not only into marital
relationships, but other intimate relationships as well, such as cohabitation
relationships, dating relationships, and same-sex relationships. Few studies
have focused specifically on unmarried cohabitants, but there is no
indication that domestic violence does not occur at the same rates as in
other types of intimate relationships. One study in particular concluded that
non-married men who live with their partners were more violent to their
partners than their married counterparts.296 According to the New York
State Division of Criminal Justice Services, in the year 2000 alone, there

dating relationship.” "’Dating relationship’ means a social relationship of a romantic or
intimate nature.
295

While a discussion of such orders are outside the scope of this article, a statute such
as this would give the legislature freer reign to provide civil protection orders to victims of
crimes other than domestic violence. For instance, to provide civil orders of protection to
victims of sex crimes or stalking at the hands of a stranger, the legislature would currently
be required to amend its definition of “family or household” to include rapists and stalkers.
For obvious reasons this is more than untoward. Instead, under a statutory scheme like the
one proposed here, the legislature would only need to add a provision stating that in
addition to preventing “domestic violence” civil orders of protection are necessary to
prevent “stalking” or “sex assault or abuse.” See, e.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14-102(1)
(2003).
296

Douglas A Brownridge, Shiva S Halli, Understanding Male Partner Violence
Against Cohabiting and Married Women: An Empirical Investigation with a Synthesized
Model, 17 J. FAM. VIOL. 341-361 (2002).
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were more than 23,000 cases of domestic violence among unmarried
couples living together.297 Studies also suggest that women living with men
at the time of the violent incident that lead to a protection order are
significantly less likely to experience any type of abuse after an order is in
place than women who do not live with their abusers.298
Members of dating relationships experience a startling amount of
violence. National surveys reveal that over thirty-five percent of both men
and women inflict some form of physical aggression or sustained violence
on their dating partners.299 Teens in dating relationships are also affected
by intimate violence. In terms of the actual number of teens affected,
research indicates that approximately one out of ten high school students
experiences physical violence in dating relationships.300 Other surveys of
students in dating relationships show that an average of twenty-eight
percent of the students experienced dating violence.301 Overall, studies
indicate that anywhere from nine percent to thirty-nine percent of high
school students experience dating violence at some point.302 A study of
emergency room records found that 72 percent of the victims of domestic
violence were not living with the abuser at the time they were assaulted.303
Partner abuse is also serious problem in gay and lesbian
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(1991).
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relationships.304 Same sex partner abuse is considered the third largest
health problem facing gay men.305 Estimates set same-sex partner abuse as
high as fifty percent,306 but the most conservative estimate is twenty
percent.307 Regardless of the actual numbers of victims and incidents of
abuse, it is plain that violence occurs in same-sex relationships, and the
members of such relationships are also entitled to protection in New York
State.308
A second possible government rationale for failing to amend the
statute is its concern for opening the floodgates to a large amount of people
thus overburdening the family courts.309 There are three responses to this.
First, the legislature has the option of providing the same civil protection
order remedies in a court other than family court. Second, as of 2002,
family offense petitions in family court only constituted about eight percent
of its case load.310 While this number may go up somewhat if the
relationship provisions are expanded, it should not create a large burden on
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Carla M. Da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of Heterosexual and Same-Sex
Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and Response, 4 S. CAL.
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OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986); Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal
Defense: An Analysis of Battered Woman's Syndrome Expert Testimony For Men and
Lesbians Who Kill Abusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379 (1993); Ruthan Robson,
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GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality:
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In denouncing a proposed amendment to amend the definition of family or
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this court. Second, an overburdening of family court is not an adequate
rationale to deny some victims of the same type of harm the same
protection. As the legislature itself stated, domestic violence “is a crime
which destroys the household as a place of safety, sanctuary, freedom and
nurturing for all household members.”311 Acts of domestic violence in
relationships other than marital ones create the identical problems, and the
legislature has identical interests in ending the violence.
Third, the government may reason that it is too expensive to provide
victims of violence in other relationships with civil orders of protection.
However, the costs of not providing civil orders of protection may, in fact,
cause a greater cost burden. As Professor Freedman has observed:
The hard work of sorting out how to respond in the domestic violence
cases in the civil courts and particularly in family court can come to seem
a low priority or even a poor investment of legal and decisional
resources. Yet, unless the resources necessary to improve the fact-finding
capacity of civil courts are provided, many domestic violence matters
that could have been handled civilly will instead escalate and be shunted
into the criminal courts, with greater costs to society and far less
satisfactory results to the individuals and families (and especially the
children) who are involved. Of course, many victims and their children
will benefit significantly from having access to civil remedies, even if
criminal remedies are later needed to address a continuation or escalation
of abusive behavior.312

By failing to include more victims of domestic violence, the legislature is
actually imposing more costs on society, both tangible and intangible. As
the legislature has stated, domestic violence “results in tremendous costs to
our social services, legal, medical and criminal justice systems, as they are
all confronted with its tragic aftermath,” and that is “the single major cause
of injury to women. More women are hurt from being beaten than are
injured in auto accidents, muggings and rapes combined.” 313 Not only does
this increase economic costs, it sends a message to the public at large that
abuse in some relationships is more tolerable than in others. Like criminal
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POL’Y & LAW 567, 590 (2003); Domestic Violence: Law Enforcement and the Courts, in
SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 303, 313-16 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds.,
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charges that send a social message that such conduct is intolerable, and that
place domestic violence in a public forum, civil remedies provide these
same social benefits, and can send the same public messages.
Fourth, there may be some concern that if the legislature expands
the types of relationships entitled to protection, more frivolous claims for
protection orders will result. However, there are procedures and penalties
in place for those who file false affidavits. Second, there is no indication
that people who file for civil orders of protection make false claims at a
greater rate than people who file other types of civil claims. For instance,
other than personal jurisdiction venue and other similar provisions, there are
not statutes limiting a person’s ability to file a civil claim for negligence,
breach of contract, or other claims in civil court, yet the system relies on its
own procedural safeguards to filter out claims without merit. Similarly, the
procedural safeguards in place in a proceeding for a civil order of protection
should serve the same purposes, and are deserving of the same trust. Also,
the stakes involved in a civil order of protection remedy, namely one’s
physical safety, are arguably stronger than those in other types of civil
actions, namely money; therefore, the balance of risks versus benefits
would seem to militate allowing more victims to seek civil orders of
protection.
Finally, the government’s most likely argument is that it need not
extend protection to relationships outside those already defined because the
state has an interest in putting its scarce resources toward relationships it
has an interest in promoting, legitimizing, and maintaining.314 In this way,
the argument goes, the state serves its interests in promoting traditional
families rather than non-traditional ones by limiting the remedy of civil
orders of protection to “legitimate” families. This argument comes to bear
especially upon relationships between members of the same sex, especially
in light of the recent debate regarding the legitimacy of gay marriages.315

314

Ross Levi, legislative counsel for the Empire State Pride Agenda was quoted as
saying that the legislature refused to expand the definition of “family and household”
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But, the state already passed a law “legitimizing” and providing
members of such relationships protection from domestic violence back in
1987. That was the year the legislature passed the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act which defines “family or household member” as including
“unrelated persons who are continually or at regular intervals living in the
same household or who have in the past continually or at regular intervals
lived in the same household316 or, “unrelated persons who have had intimate
or continuous social contact with one another and who have access to one
another’s household.”317 Consequently, the legislature has little basis on
which to stake its claim that it cannot extend protection to such
relationships.
Additionally, the rationales for “family offense” proceedings in
family court have undergone a social shift. Historically, those proceedings
were to provide “practical help” and were meant to keep traditional
families, even violent ones, together. Also, they were meant to keep
“domestic quarrels” out of the public eye. But, over time, this focus
changed to one on ending the violence. In recognition of this social shift,
the legislature acted to criminalize more acts of domestic violence,
explaining that “violence in the home is as serious a breach of public order
and safety as violence in the streets. . . . Strengthening of legal sanctions
against violence in the home is a step toward stopping it in individual cases,
and toward educating the public that violence in the homes is as much a
criminal act as violence in a public place.”318
Also, as this social shift gained strength, it repealed the provisions
regarding the importance of family cohesion and “practical help,” and
amended the statutes to reflect the new social focus not on keeping the
“family unit intact,” but to “stop the violence, end the family disruption, and
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Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 263, 285 (1992) (finding that discrimination against homosexuals
is closely related to deeply held gender-specific social and sexual roles within a culture).
316

N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a(1)(ii)(e) (McKinney 2003).

317

N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 459-a(1)(ii)(f); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regis. tit. 18,
§ 452.2(g)(2)(vi) (2003).
318

Governor’s Bill Memorandum, McKinney’s Session Laws of 1980, chaps. 530,
531, 532, pp. 1877-78; Besharov, supra note 23 at 182.

74

Judith A. Smith

15-Apr-04

obtain protection.”319 Its new “first priority is protecting family members
by ending the violence. After that is accomplished, counseling and
reconciliation can be undertaken in an atmosphere of security for all
members of the family.”320 Consequently, by its own acts historically, the
legislature cannot claim that the purposes of the family offense proceedings
are to keep legitimate families together; their intent is to end violence. The
fact that the definition of family and household is so limited is more of a
historical accident than evidence of intent to keep such families together.
Also, practically speaking, to the extent it can be argued that civil protection
orders constitute a “marital incentive,” the incentive is an absurd one.
Essentially, by providing civil orders of protection only to those who are
married or share children, the statute encourages a victim to marry or have
children with the person who is abusing her so that she can then seek a civil
order of protection that orders him to stay away. The civil order of
protection remedies actually encourage victims of violent relationships not
only to seek help, but to exit the relationship. The legislature can no longer
rely on outdated, inapplicable rationales for a system that distributes
protection based on the marital status, or parental status, of the victim.
CONCLUSION
New York has one of the most restrictive statutory structures in the
nation for victims of domestic violence to obtain civil protection orders. It
finds the need for protection only where the definitions of “family offense”
and “family or household member” intersect. There is a historical
explanation for this odd state of the law. Beginning in the 1960s, the
legislature attempted to deal with domestic violence in a more private
forum. It sought to defuse violence in families and was attempting, above
all, to keep these families together. Over time, though, the legislature
responded to a change in the social view of domestic violence. The focus
began to shift from keeping families together, to criminalizing acts of
domestic violence and bringing it to public attention.321 As a result, in an
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attempt to deal with the tension between the two interests, the legislature
created, in what can fairly be characterized as a historical accident, the
bifurcated system that exists today.
But, the shift in the role that civil orders of protection played from
keeping families together to deterring and deescalating future violence
renders the historical rationales meaningless as applied to their more
contemporary goals. New York can provide few reasons for maintaining its
current system, and must reform its civil protection order statutes to capture
all victims of domestic violence, and to include all crimes as bases for
protection. To the extent the legislature can provide current rationales to
maintain its differential treatment of domestic violence victims, it must at
least provide rational reasons that bear some relation to the goals the civil
order of protection statutes serve. It is not at all clear that the legislature can
satisfy that burden here.
The need for reform is plain. Domestic violence does not exist only
between the members of relationships that the legislature has sanctioned for
protection. Instead, violence cuts across all forms of romantic relationships
and the victims of violence in those relationships deserve the same
protection. This is true not only for New York, but for every state. Each
state should expand its civil protection order coverage to include all victims,
and all types of domestic violence.

was once largely considered a private matter has come to be more
correctly regarded as criminal behavior.
New York Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act, § 1 (1994).

APPENDIX A
State

Related

Married

Share child

Cohabitation (past
or present)

•

• as interpreted by
case law, .
Haraway v.
Phillips, 2002 WL
1728619
(Ala.Civ.App.200
2).
•

Dating

Alabama

•

•

Alaska

•

•

•

Arizona

•

•

•

•

Arkansas

•

•

•

•

California

•

•

•

•

•

Colorado

•

•

•

•

•

Connecticut

•

•

•

•

•

D.C.

•

•

•

•

•

Delaware

•

•

Florida

•

•

Georgia

•

•

•

•

Hawaii

•

•

•

•

•

Idaho

•

•

•

•

•

Illinois

•

•

•

•

•

• only
persons of
opposite
sex
•

Other

Excludes
Same Sex?

•
Pregnant

• only present
cohabitants of
opposite sex

• cohabitants
and persons
sharing child

•

15-Apr-04]

A Call for Reform

Indiana

•

•

•

Iowa

•

•

•
•

Kansas

•

77

•
• within the past
year
•

•
•

Kentucky

•

•

•

Louisiana

•

•

Maine

•

•

•

Maryland

•

•

•

Massachusetts

•

•

•

•

•

Michigan

•

•

•

•

•

Minnesota

•

•

•

•

•

Mississippi

•

•

Missouri

•

•

Montana

•

•

•

Nebraska

•

•

•

•

Nevada

•

•

•

•

• opposite sex only

Not by
statute
Protected by
AG opinion
Op.Atty.Gen.
No. 20000588,
Carrubba,
October 6,
2000

•

• cohabitants
•

• current only

•

Pregnant

• current
dating
relations
hip

•
• opposite
sex only
•

• dating
relationships

78

Judith A. Smith

15-Apr-04

New Hampshire

•

•

•

•

•

New Jersey

•

•

•

•

•

New Mexico

•

•

•

New York

•

•

•

North Carolina

•

•

•

North Dakota

•

•

•

•

Ohio

•

•

•

•

Oklahoma

•

•

•

•

Oregon

•

•

•

•

Pennsylvania

•

•

•

•

Rhode Island

•

•

•

Pregnant

•
• opposite sex only

• opposite
sex only
• current
only

• cohabitation
and dating
relationships
Any other
person with a
sufficient
relationship
to the
abusing
person as
determined
by the court
Neutral, but
case law has
interpreted as
being opposite
sex only.

•

• within
past 2
years
•
•

Present
spouses of
ex-spouses

15-Apr-04]

A Call for Reform

79

South Carolina

•

•

•

• opposite sex only

South Dakota

•

•

•

•

Tennessee

•

•

•

•

•

Texas

•

•

•

•

•

Utah

•

•

•

Vermont

•

•

Virginia

•

•

•

Washington

•

•

•

West Virginia

•

•

•

Wisconsin

•

•

•

•

•

Wyoming

•

•

•

•

•

• living as a
spouse
•

• cohabitants

Pregnant
•

• within 1 year
•

•
•

